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I. INTRODUCTION

When a party "contracts out" of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC), or of any set of rules, the power of law confronts the power
of private ordering. To what extent, we ask, should the law permit
parties to substitute a different set of rules of their own choosing for
ordinarily applicable law? The question is difficult enough when
considering the effectiveness of the parties' choice on the laws they
have chosen and, by implication, bypassed. But "contracting out"
does not simply involve a "private" contract question because the
parties' selection of any given set of rules implicates the power of the
jurisdiction whose rules they have selected and that of the
jurisdiction whose rules they have rejected.
There are many reasons why parties might wish to "contract
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out" or choose other rules through their contract, such as the
uncontroversial goals of reducing uncertainty or, perhaps, getting
better developed rules. But there are other, more questionable
reasons. The focus of this Article will be on one of these more
debatable reasons-using choice of law clauses to obtain a uniform
set of rules to govern all of a business's contracts with customers
without resorting to federal legislation to do so.
An age-old trade-off in our federal legal system is, on the one
hand, the diversity and experimentation made possible by state
lawmaking and, on the other hand, the cumbersomeness and inefficiency that this diversity presents to those multi-state traders who
have to comply with the multiple regimes in place. The National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL")
has sought to address the problem, and the UCC is NCCUSL's most
successful product.' While the results are mixed, in many areas we
have successfully obtained what amounts to national legal uniformity
without involving Congress
Among the places we have failed miserably to unify the law is in
the protective rules different states apply to the business relationships
that form between businesses and individuals. "Consumer protection" in state legislation is probably the most common form these
rules take, but the legal diversity extends far beyond that to legislation regulating employment and franchises. The diversity also
extends to judicially-developed views on issues ranging from contract formation and assent to the defenses of unconscionability,
illegality, and so on. Efforts to adopt uniform state legislation, such
as the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC), to replace this
diversity have been very disappointing.3
1. Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws,
25 J. LEGAL STUDIES 131, 150 (1996).
2. Widespread, prompt, and uniform enactment of Revised Article 9 of the UCC may well
be the best such example. See Philip H. Ebling & Steven 0. Weise, What a Dirt Lawyer Needs to
Know About New Article 9 of the UCC, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 191, 192 n. 1 (2002) ("As
of July 1, 2001, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have adopted Article 9 ...").
3. Created in 1968, the UCCC has been enacted in only eleven states. UNIF. CONSUMER
CREDIT CODE, 7 U.L.A. 88 (1974). The following states enacted the Code: Colorado, COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 5-1-101 (West 2002 & Supp. 2005); Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-41-101
(2005); Indiana, IND. CODE § 24-4.5-1-101 (2006); Iowa, IOWA CODE § 537.1101 (1997);
Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16-1-101 (1981); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 1-10, (2004);
Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. tit. 14A, § 1-101 (1996); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-1-101
(2002); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 70C-1-101 (2001); Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. § 421.101 (2005);
Wyoming, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-40-401 (2005).
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Businesses conducting interstate trade naturally wish for a
unitary set of rules. If they could choose, they might also wish those
rules to be minimally-constraining, permitting them the maximum
freedom to hire, control, and fire employees as well as to supply
goods and services however they wished in order to compete more
effectively in the global market. The outlet our constitutional system
has supplied for these yearnings is the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution, empowering Congress to "regulate Commerce...
among the several States." 4 Within a national legislative process, all
those affected by the law, in theory, have an opportunity to shape it.
A. Problems in the ContractLaw Context

This Article considers the emerging contract-based alternative to
federal legislation and to a uniform laws process perceived to be
deficient. Businesses are having consumers and others who might be
protected by otherwise-applicable state law "contract out" of that law
and replace it with some other system, one that applies (via a similar
"contracting out" process with other customers) wherever the
company does business. This elegant approach avoids the necessity
of a federal solution to the legal diversity problem. It has the added
advantage that the business can choose, from among many
jurisdictions, those rules that suit it best. Indeed, it even raises the
possibility of shaping the rules of one state and then having
customers "contract in" to that set of rules.' This strategy raises a
myriad of questions, many of which are on the contract law side of
the ledger.
First, can consumers and others "contract out" of consumer
protection laws and other rules designed to protect them from
business abuses? Put differently, will the law recognize a "waiver"
by a customer of a rule designed to protect her? The answer is
complicated6 and probably debatable as a normative matter.7 But
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 188-189.
6. An accurate answer would require a better description of a "protective rule." For
instance, an implied warranty of merchantability is a rule designed to protect buyers of products
but, by statute, we permit "waiver" of that protection. U.C.C. § 2-314 (2003) (implied warranty
of warrantability); id., § 2-316 (waiver). For present purposes, the vague description in the text
will suffice. Waivers have been addressed extensively in the literature. See, e.g., Paul D.
Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 350-96
(1996); Judith A. McMorrow, Who Owns Rights: Waiving and Settling Private Rights ofAction,
34 VILL. L. REV. 429, 440-49 (1989); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L.
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suffice it to say that at the extremes, the answer is "no." Many
protective state statutes explicitly forbid waiver of the protection
they supply,' and courts have read anti-waiver restrictions into many
others. And no citation is needed for the assertion that an executory
"waiver" of the defense of unconscionability will not resurrect an
otherwise unconscionable contract.
But the phenomenon under consideration is not normally a
problem of a knowing, voluntary, negotiated waiver that the law
renders impermissible. Rather, the multi-state compliance problem
is one that most often occurs in the mass-market setting, where
vendors supply their goods and services with forms that state the
terms of the deal and purport to bind the non-drafter. In this context,
the presence of the form contract adds the problem of contractual
assent to the already difficult problems that executory waivers of
protection have given us.
But a further contract law difficulty is that the "waivers" that are
the focus of this Article do not appear as "waivers" at all: they read
as "choice of law" clauses. Through these terms in a vendor's form,
the recipient purports to "contract out" of her own protective legal
rules and into a different set of rules, the functional equivalent of
waiver without the use of the term. This obviously adds "disclosure"
to the difficult list of contract law problems we now confront.
Indeed, the innocuous-looking choice of law clause turns out to be
the best legal "cloaking device" yet invented. Who would dream that
by "choosing" Delaware law, one would lose her right to bring a

REV. 1849, 1852-55 (1987); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business:
Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV.
33, 110-27 (1997); Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitrationas Exceptional Consumer Law (With
a ContractualistReply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 195, 202-03, 205-10
(1998).
7. See Ware, supra note 6, at 209-13 (discussing the debate between the contractual and
anti-contractual approaches to arbitration law).
8. E.g., California Corporate Securities Law of 1968, CAL. CORP. CODE § 25701 (West
2006) (no waiver of securities protection); California Consumers Legal Remedies Act, CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1751 (West 1998) (no waiver of consumer protection); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §
5006B(b) (LexisNexis 2005) (no waiver of consumer rights in purchase of assistive technology
device); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 705/41 (West 1999) (no waiver of protections under
Franchise Disclosure Act); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80C.21 (West 1999 & Supp. 2006) (no waiver of
statutory rights related to acquisition of a franchise); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-113 (2001 &
Supp. 2005) (no waiver of consumer protection provisions); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §
17.42 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2006) (no waiver of consumer protections provided that certain
conditions exist).
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class action? 9 Or that by "choosing" North Carolina law, one could
possibly "waive" the right to challenge a no-compete clause as illegal
under one's home statutes?1" Or by "choosing" Wisconsin law, one
would be stuck with the terms a vendor buried in a box intended to
be opened long after the goods in the box were bought and paid
for? 1 By putting the waiver into the form of a choice of law clause,
vendors have clearly camouflaged its effects from customers. As an
added bonus to the vendors, the complexity of the principles that
control these provisions may effectively hide them from both the
courts and lawyers who confront them.
B. Problems in the Conflict of Laws Context
Where the contract law problems leave off, the conflict of laws
problems begin. Because the customers are "waiving" their protection through the use of choice of law clauses, conflict of laws
rules and concerns are triggered. Thus, the problem implicates not
simply the businesses, their customers, and the law that controls their
relationship to one another; but it also concerns the relations among
the different states, each of which has developed its own peculiar
version of protection for those over whom they exercise jurisdiction.
To what extent must (or should) courts of a chosen state defer to the
legal protections another state gives its residents when a choice of
law provision in the underlying contract "contracts out" of that other
state's law? What, if anything, changes if the opting out is through a
mass-market form distributed not just to one contracting party, but to
thousands of customers in the "unchosen" jurisdiction?
Businesses would no doubt wish for the simple answer, that the
law "chosen" applies in all cases with no exceptions. Such an
answer would vastly simplify the legal compliance problems
businesses face, and they have pressed this position in litigation. 2
Moreover, there are traces of this same position in the legislation of
some states that have attempted to project their own policy mix onto
9. See Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1117-18 (Cal. 2005).
10. See Cherry, Bekaert & Holland v. Brown, 582 So. 2d 502, 505-06 (Ala. 1991).
11. Cf Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997). In this near-infamous
case, there was (apparently) no choice of law provision. But anyone reading that case would have
no doubt that had a choice of law provision been included in the box with the computer, Judge
Easterbrook would have enforced that too unless, of course, the customer sent the computer back
within the thirty days Gateway specified in its form. See infra text accompanying notes 149-152.
12. See, e.g., Herring Gas Co., Inc. v. Magee, 22 F.3d 603, 607-09 (5th Cir. 1994).
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residents of other states. 3 As if to underscore the larger conflicts
questions implicated by these developments, other states have begun
(sometimes in response) to develop "shield legislation"-by which I
mean legislation intended to protect the integrity of a jurisdiction's
own protective law from dilution through choice of law clauses. 4
More than fifty years ago, Professor Albert Ehrenzweig, a
leading conflicts scholar, stated that "[w]hatever the status of the
principle of party autonomy in the conflicts law of contracts in
general, this principle has no place in the conflicts law of adhesion
contracts."' 5 Whether or not that is true today, it should be apparent
that understanding and developing limitations on choice of law
clauses in adhesion contracts implicates a very complex array of
legal principles.
This Article attempts to unravel those principles while exploring
the potential for shielding our vast and rich legal diversity in state
protective rules from adhesive "contracting out." In pursuing this
objective, we will consider common law principles found in conflict
of laws and contract law rules, state and federal legislation, and the
market itself.
As we proceed, it will be important to keep in mind that a rule
that avoids a choice of law provision has no effect on the coverage,
substance, or remedies of the underlying law, nor does it have any
effect on the underlying conflicts question: what is the "normally
applicable" law? A shield rule of the kind focused on here will only
protect the underlying law (whatever it is), not change it. Indeed,
shield laws simply neutralize the choice of law provision so that the
normally-applicable law can operate as it would have, absent the
choice of law provision.
In addition, in our federal system, conflicts rules-the rules that
address (among other matters) the extraterritorial effect of each

13. Delaware, for example, requires its banks to use Delaware law in its contracts with
customers in other states. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4-102(b) (2005). Maryland and Virginia have
enacted non-uniform versions of Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act ("UCITA")
that require enforcement, in their respective courts, of choice of law clauses with very few
limitations. See infra note 300 and accompanying text.
14. Several states have, for example, created "bomb shelter" legislation to protect their
residents from the application of UCITA through choice of law clauses. See infra note 334 and
accompanying text.
15. Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 COLUM. L. REV.
1072, 1090 (1953).
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state's rules-are themselves state rules, and they too are somewhat
diverse. This means that the identity of the forum is inevitably a
factor, and therefore consideration must also be given to forum and
contractual choice of forum clauses. Thus, to the extent necessary,
the discussion will also address both the effect of choice of forum
clauses on choice of law (and vice versa) and strategies for
addressing those effects.
Part II begins by briefly developing a methodology for
segregating the conflicts and contract issues that are raised by choice
of law or forum provisions,6 a process made necessary by our
tendency to obscure the contract law issues with conflict of laws
analysis. Part III generally explores the common law rules in place
that might be brought to bear on choice of law provisions. The law
is in a substantial state of flux, and we will consider the potential
offered by contracts and conflicts principles to control excessive use
of choice of law provisions.
It must be recognized that judicial control through common law
may be effective only in individual cases. Given the nature of
consumer litigation, judicial control may not be potent enough to
cope with both the widespread presence of choice of law provisions
and the widespread enforcement of arbitration clauses in adhesion
contracts. Part IV will thus consider a range of legislative responses
that might be considered in an effort to limit choice of law provisions
in adhesive settings. The Article concludes by briefly considering
the use of the free market or even federal legislation as alternative
means of limiting these provisions.
II. SEGREGATING THE CONTRACT AND THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS PRINCIPLES: A THREE-STEP ANALYSIS

In the complex analysis that often accompanies choice of law
clauses, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that the enforcement of
these provisions depends on plain, ordinary contract law. Whether
they appear in negotiated contracts or adhesive forms, choice of law
clauses are not binding unless we first conclude that they are
enforceable as a matter of contract law. Every choice of law clause
is a contractual provision; therefore, it is necessary to isolate the
16. This methodology will be derived from a fuller description found in William J.
Woodward, Jr., Findingthe Contract in Contractsfor Law, Forum and Arbitration, 2 HASTINGS

BUS. L.J. 1, 19-32, 36-39 (2006).
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contract issues in order to fully understand how the law can
effectively regulate these provisions.
What has generated confusion is the fact that a full
understanding of choice of law clauses entails not only a contracts
analysis, but also two distinct conflict of laws analyses. Together,
they form a three-step analysis. In the first step, the forum court
faces an initial conflict of laws question of which state's contract law
governs the choice of law or choice of forum provision in the
contract. In the second step, the forum court, after determining the
appropriate state law, applies that contract law to the choice of law or
forum clause to determine whether the provision is binding on the
parties as a matter of contract law. In the last step, if the court does
find the provision to be binding under applicable contract law, the
court asks a second conflict of laws question: whether the forum
court should recognize the contractual choice of law or choice of
forum the parties collectively made or whether the forum state's
policies should override the parties' agreement to the choice of law
or forum.
As I have developed in greater detail elsewhere, the conflict of
laws analysis at both the first and third steps is difficult and
uncertain." The relevant conflicts rules for analyzing contractual
choice of law clauses have been articulated in the Second
Restatement of Conflict of Laws Section 187,8 which is recognized
by a plurality of states. 9 As if to underscore the analytical structure I
have described, the Restatement provision begins with the
assumption that there is a fully formed contract-for-law and then
enumerates principles that might limit such an expression of party
autonomy.2" It provides in part:
(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern
their contractual rights and duties will be applied, even if
the particular issue is one which the parties could not have
17. See generally Id. , at 25-32, 35-40 (suggesting the difficulty of the conflict of laws
analysis in a three-step analysis and explaining conflict of laws restrictions on otherwise valid
choice of law provisions).
18.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2) (1989).

19. Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2003: Seventeenth
Annual Survey, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 9, 28 (2004).
20. Comment A begins with the sentence: "The rule of this Section is applicable only in
situations where it is established to the satisfaction of the forum that the parties have chosen the
state of the applicable law." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2) cmt. a.
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resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed
to that issue, unless either
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to
the parties or the transaction and there is no other
reasonable basis for the parties' choice, or
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be
contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a
materially greater interest than the chosen state in the
determination of the particular issue and which, under
the rule of § 188, would be the state of the applicable
law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the
parties.2
In the framework set out above, this Restatement provision
operates at the third step, after a court has found as a matter of
contractlaw that the parties have made a contract-for-law.
A. Step One: Using Conflicts Law
to Determine Whose ContractLaw to Apply
The other conflicts question-that is, the initial question of
which state's contract law should be applied to determine whether
the underlying contract is enforceable-is scarcely addressed
anywhere. We find guidance in the Second Restatement of Conflict
of Laws only in a comment to the above provision addressing
contractual choice of law. That comment provides, in pertinent part:
A choice-of-law provision, like any other contractual
provision, will not be given effect if the consent of one of
the parties to its inclusion in the contract was obtained by
improper means, such as by misrepresentation, duress, or
undue influence, or by mistake. Whether such consent was
in fact obtained by improper means or by mistake will be
determined by the forum in accordance with its own legal
principles.22
To the extent that this statement addresses the initial conflicts
inquiry in the first step, it deviates from the predominant conflict of
laws principle with which a forum court usually begins as it seeks the

21. Id. § 187(2) (emphasis added).
22. Id. § 187(2) cmt. b (emphasis added).
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appropriate law to apply to a contract. Whereas Comment b directs
a forum court to apply the rules of the state in which it sits, Section
188 of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws,24 which states
the dominant conflicts approach, directs a forum court to use the
contract law of the jurisdiction with the "most significant
relationship" in deciding most contract law questions.2 5 This "center
of gravity" approach has two underlying ideas: (1) if the parties had
any law in mind at all, it was probably the law with the most
substantial relationship to them and their contract (a contract or
commercial law-based policy); and (2) the state with the most
substantial relationship to the contract probably has the greatest
interest in controlling the contract with its law (a conflicts or
constitutional law-based policy).26
This approach, if applied
uniformly by all forum courts, would advance the policies underlying
the conflicts system by reducing the significance of forum choice.
At least in theory, all fora would then perceive the same "center of
gravity" and would therefore apply the same substantive law to the
contract.
Under Section 188's "center of gravity" approach,
therefore, forum choice would be less significant.
The apparently contrary statement in the Comment b to Section
187 is curious because applying the law of the forum state to a
threshold contract question opens the potential for forum shopping. 7
On reflection, however, it seems likely to be a good distillation of the
cases and a sensible rule as well.
When a plaintiff brings an action in an "unchosen" forum, the
odds are very high that it is the plaintiffs own location, 28 a
23. Id.
24. See Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 995 P.2d 1002, 1007 (Mont. 2000) (noting that courts
have principally used Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws analysis because it allows courts
to analyze and focus on the policies that underlie the conflicting laws) (citing In re Air Crash
Disaster at Boston, Mass. on July 31, 1973, 399 F. Supp. 1106, 1100 (D.Mass. 1975)).
25.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188.

26. See Fricke v. Isbrandtsen Co., 151 F. Supp. 465, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. b.
28. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 585 (1991) (plaintiffs brought
claim in their state of residence); Hengel, Inc. v. Hot 'N Now, Inc., 825 F. Supp. 1311, 1314
(N.D. 111.1993) (plaintiffs chose forum where the franchise in question was located); Cherry,
Bekaert & Holland v. Brown, 582 So. 2d. 502, 504 (Ala. 1991) (plaintiff brought suit in the
forum state that the agreement was made); Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1103
(Cal. 2005) (plaintiff chose forum where she was a resident); Aral v. Earthlink, Inc., 36 Cal. Rptr.
3d 229, 232-33 (Ct. App. 2005) (class brought claim in state of residence); Am. Online, Inc. v.
Booker, 781 So. 2d 423, 424 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (class brought claim in state of residence);
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jurisdiction that at least has a relationship with the plaintiff and
probably has a reasonably strong relationship with the underlying
contract. In this setting, if a forum court brings its own contract law
to bear on the choice of law or forum provision found in that
contract, the court is implicitly applying a form of the "center of
gravity" approach to the conflicts question, perhaps weighted in
favor of forum law with which the court will be most familiar.
Given the fact that the forum's own policies are often at issue in such
settings, there is added reason for the forum court to begin with its
own contract law to decide the threshold question whether the choice
of law or forum provision is binding in the first instance.
Were a plaintiff to bring an action in an "unchosen" forum that
had little or no relationship with the parties or their contract, the use
of forum law for this threshold contracts question would be
problematic. No such cases have been found, and none are likely to
be found, for the simple reason that a plaintiff attempting to avoid a
choice of law or forum provision would likely bring her action in a
forum she viewed as sympathetic. 9 A forum with little or no
relationship with the parties or their contract would not likely be
such a forum.
B. Step Two: Using ContractLaw to Determine
Whether the Choice of Law ProvisionIs Enforceable

Once the forum court locates the appropriate contract law
through this threshold conflict of laws analysis, that contract law can
Convergys Corp. v. Keener, 582 S.E.2d 84, 84-85 (Ga. 2003) (plaintiff chose federal court in
state where he was residing); Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 995 P.2d 1002, 1002, 1005 (Mont.
2000) (plaintiff chose forum where the deceased whom he represented had resided); Kubis &
Perszyk Assocs. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 680 A.2d 618, 618, 620 (N.J. 1996) (plaintiff
franchisee brought claim in its home state); Param Petroleum Corp. v. Commerce & Indus. Ins.
Co., 686 A.2d 377, 377-78 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (plaintiff company brought claim in
its home state); O'Brien v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 586 P.2d 830, 831 (Wash. 1978) (class
brought action in home state).
29. An exception that may prove the rule is Edelist v. MBNA America Bank, 790 A.2d 1249
(Del. Super. Ct. 2001). There, the California plaintiff sued the Delaware bank in Delaware, not in
California, and pled that "Plaintiffs claims for Breach of Contract, Tortious Breach of the
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, Fraudulent or Negligent Misrepresentation
and Consumer Fraud arise under Delaware law." Id. at 1255. The Delaware court found that, in
accordance with the contract, Delaware law controlled and that class action waivers within
arbitration agreements were not unconscionable under Delaware law, and dismissed the plaintiff's
case. Id. at 1260-61. Implicitly, the Delaware court applied Delaware contract law to the
question whether the parties were bound to the choice of law provision. Id. at 1255-57. This
case is discussed in Woodward, supra note 16, at 36-39.
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then be applied to the question whether the parties contracted for a
particular jurisdiction's law to apply to their agreement. The cases
do not reflect a rich contract law analysis, possibly because the
contract issues are overshadowed by step three of the inquiry,
whether conflict of laws principles require non-recognition of the
contract-for-law. 0 A more complete contract law analysis could
bring the full range of contract law inquiries to bear on such topics as
assent, capacity, deception, or pressure and could result in a court's
refusal to accord legal status to the alleged contract. Without an
enforceable contract-for-law, the inquiry ends, and the applicable law
(found through application of the forum's conflicts principles) in the
absence of a choice of law provision controls the contract.
C. Step Three: Using Conflicts Law to Determine
Whether the Choice of Law ProvisionShould Be Enforceable
Even if a contract-for-law is found at the second stage, the
analysis is not over yet. Conflict of laws principles limit "party
autonomy" of contracting parties to specify the law to be applied to
their contract." Thus, once the contract is recognized by contract
law, the step three analysis considers whether the contract, effective
between the parties, should be unenforceable based on conflict of
laws principles. It is this third stage inquiry that has tended to
dominate the analysis of choice of law clauses in the courts.3"
III. RECONCILING ADHESIVE CHOICE OF
LAW PROVISIONS WITH THE COMMON LAW

A. Clash of Values: Autonomy, Efficiency, and Federalism
For most of the twentieth century, we witnessed expanded use of
the concept of "party autonomy" to justify contractual choice of
law.33 While "party autonomy" was never unlimited, the recent trend
has been to favor fewer limitations; the response has been to argue

30. See, e.g., Am. Online, Inc. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699, 708-13 (Ct. App.
2001) (discussing the terms of the contract only insofar as they violate the no-waiver protections
of California law).
31. See William J. Woodward, ContractualChoice of Law: Legislative Choice in An Era of
Party Autonomy, 54 SMU L. REv. 697, 699-700 (2001).
32. See, e.g., Am. Online, Inc., 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 708-13.
33. See Woodward, supra note 31, at 711-15.
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for more.3 4 Before considering the steps a state might take to
regulate choice of law clauses, it will be useful to focus on what is at
stake, especially in the unique area of mass-market transactions.
Widespread enforcement of adhesive choice of law clauses can not
only disadvantage customers by substituting a weaker form of
customer protection for that which their own state offers, but it can
35
also threaten the workings of our constitutional system.
In our federal system, we have diversity in our state laws that
generally govern contractual relationships; even the U.C.C. has a
considerable amount of "nonuniformity."36 Each state has its own
peculiar balance of free market and business regulation, and each
state's residents live with the consequences of that balance. The
restrictions on businesses and their practices come most obviously in
the form of legislation,37 but they also come from judiciallydeveloped principles such as unconscionability, reasonable
expectations, and different ways of viewing the requirements for
contract formation in the first place.38 Business lobbyists, probusiness commentators, and others will attempt to correlate high
levels of business regulation with higher prices,39 but whether or not
such relationships hold, it is quite clear that under our system states
can strike their own balances and should do so.
While some rules designed to protect individuals in their
dealings with businesses are clearly "waivable,"4 many are not,
even with actually negotiated contracts where true assent is not at
34. Id.
35. Limiting choice of forum clauses is important in maintaining customer remedies for torts
and contract breaches and in making the limitations on choice of law clauses effective. For the
most part, contract law limitations on the use of choice of forum clauses will follow the same
principles.
36. F. Stephen Knippenberg & William J. Woodward, Jr., Uniformity and Efficiency in the
Uniform Commercial Code: A PartialResearch Agenda, 45 Bus. LAW. 2519, 2530 (1990).
37. See, e.g., California Unfair Competition Act, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-17205
(West 1997 & Supp. 2006); Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 501.201-.213 (West 2006); Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, TEX.
BUS. & COM.CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-17.63 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2006); U.C.C. §§ 2-314 to -315
(2003).
38. See infra Part II.B.2.
39. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, ParadoxicalPerils of the PrecautionaryPrinciple,53 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 851, 915 (1996) ("Much of the cost of regulation will be passed on to consumers
in the form of higher prices."). If business regulation drives businesses from a state, it no doubt
has an effect on the tax base as well.
40. The most obvious example is the UCC implied warranty of merchantability, which is
"waivable" by statute. U.C.C. § 2-316 (2002).
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issue." Many modem courts have sensibly concluded that protection
that is not waivable through an explicit waiver does not magically
become waivable through a choice of law clause.42
Moreover, as a matter of tradition, contract and commercial law
continue to be state law, and such consumer protection as exists is
nearly all found at the state law level.43 We continue to engage in the
cumbersome process of enacting "uniform" commercial law at the
state level, notwithstanding the very high likelihood that states will
not enact it uniformly." We obviously place very high value on
local governance, local diversity, and local control over issues that
matter to a state's residents.45 Widespread, insensitive enforcement
of choice of law clauses in adhesion contracts can undercut the state
law to which residents and taxpayers are entitled under our political
system.
On the other side of the ledger, there are strong values that favor
opting out. In theory, choice of law provisions fix the legal
environment against which parties bargain, and in that sense,
contribute value by reducing uncertainty as to which jurisdiction's
law applies. To be sure, no simple choice of law clause can
eliminate later argument on a variety of "what part of that chosen

41. E.g., Consumers Legal Remedies Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1751 (West 1998) ("Any
waiver by a consumer of the provisions of this title is contrary to public policy and shall be
unenforceable and void."); Iowa Consumer Credit Code, IOWA CODE ANN. § 537.1107 (West
1997) ("Except in settlement of a bona fide dispute, a consumer may not waive or agree to forego
rights or benefits under this Act.").
42. See, e.g., Hengel, Inc. v. Hot 'N Now, Inc., 825 F. Supp. 1311, 1315-17 (N.D. Ill. 1993)
(holding that the choice of Michigan law cannot excuse the parties from the anti-waiver provision
of the Illinois Franchise Disclosure Act); Physicians Weight Loss Ctrs. of Am., Inc. v. McLean,
No. 90-CV-2065, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13107, at *5-*6 (N.D. Ohio June 28, 1991) (noting that
the legislatures of Maine, Connecticut, and Indiana enacted anti-waiver provisions which
invalidate the choice of Ohio law provisions); Instructional Sys., Inc. v. Computer Curriculum
Corp., 614 A.2d 124, 126 (N.J. 1992) (stating that the New Jersey Franchise Practices Act applies
even if there is a "Reseller Agreement" that provides for California law).
43. Notable exceptions are the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667 (2000), the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 23012312 (2000), and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2000).
44. See generally Knippenberg & Woodward, supra note 36, at 2520 (noting that many
states have different versions of the U.C.C. and that non-uniform amendments to the UCC are not
uncommon).
45. Cf Maureen A. O'Rourke, Progressing Towards a Uniform Commercial Code for
Electronic Commerce or Racing Towards Nonuniformity?, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 635, 643
(1999) (noting the importance of allowing local jurisdictions to apply their own values in their
own laws in international transactions).
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jurisdiction's law applies,"46 but at least it tends to reduce later
argument on the broader question. Choice of law clauses in
negotiated contracts are, at this point in our legal development, noncontroversial as a matter of either contract law or of conflict of laws.
There remain some minimal conflict of laws limitations on the
clauses,47 but for the most part, they are enforced routinely.48
As mass-market transactions increasingly involve adhesive form
contracts, however, the justification for enforcement-(collective)
"party autonomy"-falls away, and the now-unilateral nature of the
choice of law provision generates different dynamics. "Choice"
itself is obviously different: unlike situations involving a negotiated
contract, the drafter of a form contract chooses the law, and the
customer is likely either unaware of the provision itself or, even if
she sees it, has no idea what its implications might be. If risk is
being shifted, the non-drafter will be unaware of it. Moreover,
because we are dealing with many identical transactions rather than
one unique one, the reasons for including a choice of law clause
become different. In the mass-market setting, the business drafter
has a keen interest in avoiding that major commercial downside of
federalism: the compliance issues implicated by dealing with the
rules of fifty different states. Federal legislation is usually the
answer to this commercial problem, but if the same can be
accomplished through adhesive choice of law clauses, the difficult
compromises that might be required at the federal level become
unnecessary.
Thus, choice of law clauses in forms promulgated to a massmarket create a strong clash of values. Against this backdrop,
businesses promote choice of law clauses as a commercial answer to
the inefficiency of legal diversity, diversity that is most likely to be
found in the unique balance each state strikes between the free
market and the limitations they place on businesses through common

46. For example, a choice of law provision would likely be ineffective to convert a sale and
security interest into a true lease or a contract for the sale of goods into one for services. See, e.g.,
U.C.C. § 1-203 (2004) (converting to a lease); Softman Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F.
Supp. 2d 1075, 1084 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (converting to services).
47. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2) (1989).
48. See Symeonides, supra note 19, at 37-39 (noting that in only a few federal appellate
court cases did the court refuse to enforce choice of law clauses); EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL.,
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 18 (4th ed. 2004).
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law and legislation.49 States, on the other hand, are the primary
source of commercial and consumer law, and they have a strong
interest-indeed a constitutional duty-to develop a legal environment best suited and responsive to their constituents."
Legal
diversity is part of the constitutional plan and local commercial law a
strong tradition; Congress, acting through the Commerce Clause, is
the antidote to that diversity when it inhibits commerce.
Moreover, once we entertain the idea that mass-market choice of
law clauses can solve the commercial diversity problem, we open the
possibility that businesses will select the law that is best for them
rather than the law that is best for both parties to the contract.
Whether this results in a "race to the bottom" or a "race to the top," 5 '
it opens the door to one state setting the free market-business
regulation balance for customers everywhere, despite the fact that
out-of-state customers have no say in the lawmaking process or in
the benefits that the "chosen" state's citizens derive from the chosen
state's particular balance.
B. JudicialLimits on Choice of Law Clauses

1. Limits Based in Conflict of Laws Principles
Section 187 of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws
provides a complex test for the last step of the three-step analysisthat is, recognizing the collective party autonomy to choose
applicable law after finding a contract-for-law in the contract law
analysis of step two.52 As Section 187 states, the law "chosen by the
parties" must have a "substantial relationship" with the parties or
transaction, or there must be some other reasonable basis for the
parties' choice. 3 If that test is satisfied, the court will defer to party
49. This particular economic justification has nothing to do with actual knowing assent on
the part of customers. Whether such an economic justification, devoid of recipient consent, ought
to weigh heavily is a very debatable question. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Humans,
Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 IND. L.J. 1125, 1127 (2000) ("Economic analysis,
within its zone of applicability, can make a good case for enforcement of contracts without
consent in specific classes of circumstances .....
50. See Woodward, supra note 31, at 701.
51. See Larry E. Ribstein, Choosing Law by Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245, 249 (1993)
(arguing that permitting the parties to determine which law is to govern will encourage the
legislature to make superior laws).
52. See supra text accompanying note 18.
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1989). The classic case stated
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autonomy, unless use of the chosen law would violate the
"fundamental policy" of a state (1) that has a materially greater
interest in the determination of the particular issue and (2) whose law
would apply under Section 188 in the absence of party choice. 4
Thus, the forum state is directed by this rule to override the parties'
choice if it violates the fundamental policy of (potentially) yet a third
state. 5 The theory is sound as a conflict of laws matter (if all forums
use this same rule, they will all require the chosen law to yield to the
fundamental policy of the same state; forum shopping will not then
matter). But the complexity of the inquiry no doubt makes it
extremely difficult to predict the outcome. 6
Moreover, the
formulation does not take into account the real possibility that the
forum will find the chosen law repugnant to its own policies, and
under some theory, refuse to enforce the choice of law because of
that repugnancy. 7
As if this indeterminancy in conflict of law limitations on choice
of law provisions were not enough, there is also a wild card in the
deck: if a given issue is perceived as "procedural," then forum law
simply controls. 8 Of course, in many cases the line separating
substance and procedure is anything but crisp. In Discover Bank v.
Superior Court, for example, at issue was the question whether a
class action waiver in an adhesion contract was enforceable. 9 The
California Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for a
determination of the applicable law in light of the choice of
for the latter part of this test is a situation in which neither party trusts the law of the other's
jurisdiction, and, to make the deal viable, they settle on the law of some "neutral" jurisdiction.
See U.C.C. § 1-301(e) cmt. 5 (2003). The same dynamic may underlie the choice of a "neutral"
forum as in Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15-21 (1972). Bremen was a case
where the forum was unrelated to either the parties or their transaction. Obtaining neutral law
may have been a consequence of litigating in the neutral forum in that case. See Woodward,
supra note 31, at 714-15.
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
55. Id.
56. See Convergys Corp. v. Keener, 582 S.E.2d 84, 85-86 (Ga. 2003) (refusing to adopt
Section 187 of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws, in part, because of the complexity of
the inquiry).
57. The drafters of the new choice of law provision in U.C.C. Section 1-301 explicitly
dodged the question of whether the forum might override the parties' choice of law because of a
claimed clash with the forum's own policy. U.C.C. § 1-301(e) cmt. 9; see also SCOLES ET AL.,
supra note 48, § 18.12, at 986-87.
58. See Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1109 (Cal. 2005).
59. Id. at 1103.
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Delaware law provision in the contract. 6' A possibility alluded to by
both the majority and the dissent was that class actions were simply
matters of procedure and that, therefore, California law (which did
not recognize class action waivers) would apply even if the Delaware
law provision were enforceable. 6'
a. Lack of a "substantialrelationship"
For negotiated contracts, the substantial relationship restriction
seldom invalidates a choice of law by the parties. 62 There is, of
course, a scattering of cases where the courts have invalidated a
choice of law as having an insufficient relationship with the parties
or their contract, but most of these cases can be understood either as
freak cases or cases where superseding events effectively separated
the selected law from the parties and their contract.63 In mass-market
form contracts, the drafter will typically select the law of its home
jurisdiction. 64 Such a selection will obviously overcome a challenge
under the substantial relationship test because one of the contracting
parties is located or incorporated in the selected state.
b. Fundamentalpolicy restrictionson choice of law provisions
For mass-market contracts, it is likely that the conflict of laws
limitations will come from the "fundamental policy" restriction on
the parties' power to choose their own law. In the typical setting, an
out-of-state vendor will specify the applicable law in the form
contract, and subsequent litigation will begin in the customer's home
state. In that context, the vendor will argue that the law chosen in the
60. Id. at 1118.
61. Id. at 1109; 1121 (Id. at Baxter, J. dissenting). On remand, the intermediate appeals
court concluded that the plaintiff had not placed the case into the "procedure" loophole of the rule
saying, "the law of unconscionability is not procedural. Rather, it is part of the substantive law of
contracts, and Boehr does not argue to the contrary." Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 456, 464 (Ct. App. 2005).
62. See Woodward, supra note 31, at 716-21.
63. Id.
64. This is not uniformly the case.
In CCR Data Systems, Inc. v. Panasonic
Communications & System. Co., No. CIV. 94-546-M, 1995 WL 54380 at *4 (D.N.H. Jan. 31,
1995) the drafter was incorporated in Delaware and had its offices in Illinois but chose New York
law to control its contract with a New Hampshire corporation. Its argument that it chose New
York law to get a uniform interpretation of its agreements in many different jurisdictions did not
prevent the court from invalidating the choice as "unrelated" to New York. Id. at *5. But cf
Schroeder v. Rynel, Ltd., 720 A.2d 1164 (Me. 1998) (keeping the drafter's choice of law despite
the absence of a relationship at the time the contract was made).
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form contract controls all contract inquiries, from formation to
unconscionability.65 The effect of an enforceable choice of law
clause in this context is to project the chosen state's view of public
policy into the state of the customer's residence.66 A potential tool
for limiting this type of projection and its ability to control cases is
the "fundamental policy" restriction on choice of law provisions
found in Section 187 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws.67
A very clear example of the potentially-controlling nature of a
choice of law clause in an adhesion contract is Scheifley v. Discover
Bank,6" an unpublished decision from the federal court in Tacoma,
Washington. Plaintiff brought an action against the bank alleging
violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act and was seeking class
action status for it; the bank was seeking to stay the action and send
it to arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause in the bank's
documents.69 Plaintiff challenged the arbitration provision as
unconscionable because it contained a class action waiver.7" This
brought her into contact with another provision in the form, the one
specifying the law of Delaware as the applicable law."1 The court's
summary enforcement of the choice of law provision effectively
decided the entire case. Contrary to the cases the plaintiff cited from
Washington and other jurisdictions, Delaware courts had held that
class action waivers did not render arbitration clauses unconscionable.72
Potentially available to Ms. Scheifley were a contract law
challenge (that we will consider later in this Article) and a conflict of
laws challenge predicated on the fundamental policy exception in the

65. See, e.g., Herring Gas Co. v. McGee, 22 F.3d 603, 607-09 (5th Cir. 1994); Physicians
Weight Loss Ctrs. of Am., Inc. v. Creighton, No. 90-CV-2066, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12720, at
*3, *22 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 1991); Cherry, Bekaert & Holland v. Brown, 582 So. 2d. 502, 50508 (Ala. 1991); Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1117 (Cal. 2005); Olinick v.
BMG Entr't, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 268, 272, 277-78 (Ct. App. 2006); Aral v. Earthlink, Inc., 36 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 229, 231-33 (Ct. App. 2005).
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. g (1989).
67. Id.
68. No. CV 03-2801 RBL (W.D. Wash. June 25, 2004).

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws.73 Had she raised an
unconscionability challenge, might she have made a plausible case
that the application of Delaware law, as specified in the choice of
law provision, violated the "fundamental policy" of her home state of
Washington?74 As discussed earlier, the Second Restatement of
Conflict of Laws requires that the fundamental policy come from a
state "which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in
the determination of the particular issue and which, under the rule of
Section 188, would be the state of the applicable law in the absence
of an effective choice of law by the parties."75 To meet this standard,
a customer would have to show that her home state's law would have
applied in the absence of a choice of law clause and that her state's
unconscionability (or other consumer-protective contract law)
principles were "fundamental policy" in her own state. The cases
reveal very few such challenges to choice of law clauses in the massmarket adhesion contract setting.76 Cases from better-developed
areas suggest that such a challenge, while potentially complex, may
have some promise.
The most common situations raising the fundamental policy
restriction are those involving no-compete clauses in employment
and franchise contracts. Here, the state law chosen by the multi-state
employer will typically permit the employer to engage in some
practice that is forbidden in the state where the employee physically
works. Enforcing the choice of law provision amounts to allowing
73. Washington appears to embrace the fundamental policy exception in its courts' conflict
of laws analysis. See O'Brien v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 586 P.2d 830, 833 (Wash. 1978)
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. g (1971)).
74. As the case stood, Delaware law gave the court an easy way to decide the case without
confronting the difficult issues that an unconscionability challenge to a class action waiver
presents. A fundamental policy challenge to the choice of law provision would, at a minimum,
have required the court to consider Washington law and the actual strength of any policy views
that differed from Delaware's. Compare the analysis in Discover Bank v. Superior Court and
Aral v. Earthlink, Inc. which are companion cases from the California appellate courts showing
the rich-and difficult--conflicts analysis raised by choice of law clauses in this context. See
infra text accompanying notes 191-205.
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1989); see also supra text
accompanying note 21.
76. This may be changing. In 2005, the California Supreme Court decided a significant
arbitration case that ultimately turned on a choice of law provision in an adhesion contract.
Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1103 (Cal. 2005). The case on remand,
Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. Rptr. 456 (Ct. App. 2005), and a companion case, Aral
v. Earthlink, Inc., 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 229 (Ct. App. 2005), form the best analysis in the cases to date
of these issues. See infra text accompanying notes 194-205.
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the forbidden practice to flourish in the physical location where it is
normally forbidden. Depending on the practice at issue, this
outcome could be perceived as de minimus or as a serious challenge
to the regulatory authority of the employee's state government. The
"party autonomy" to choose law yields to superior state regulatory
power when the court concludes that the matter at issue implicates
"fundamental policy."
A well-developed example illustrating the complexity of the
fundamental policy restriction in Section 187 of the Second
Restatement of Conflict of Laws Section 187 is Herring Gas
Company v. Magee.7 ' There, the Mississippi employer included in
its employment contracts a provision that restricted competition for a
period of six years at any location within fifty miles of any Herring
Gas location, including those in Louisiana, a state which by statute
declared no-compete agreements in excess of two years "null and
void."" Seeking a declaratory judgment in a federal district court in
Mississippi to affirm the enforceability of the provision in Louisiana,
the employer argued that the no-compete contract specified that it
would be governed by Mississippi law, which contained no such
restrictions.7 9 Thus, the question before the federal district court was
whether a Mississippi court would conclude that the no-compete
provision violated the fundamental policy of Louisiana so as to make
it unenforceable in Louisiana."
The employees' case foundered not on the question whether the
Louisiana statute expressed that state's fundamental policy, but
rather on the preceding questions under the Restatement provision:
whether Louisiana had a "materially greater interest" than
Mississippi in the application of its law, and whether Louisiana law
would apply under Restatement Section 188 in the absence of the
parties' choice.8' The employer apparently had more outlets in
Mississippi than in Louisiana, the contract had been executed in
Mississippi, and two of the four persons involved resided in
77. 22 F.3d 603 (5th Cir. 1994) (applying Mississippi conflict of law rules).
78. Id. at 604 (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (Supp. 1994)).
79. Id. at 604.
80. Id. at 604-05. Because the federal district court sat in Mississippi, Mississippi conflict
rules applied. Id. at 605. Hence, the court pursued the conflicts question through the lens of a
Mississippi (not a Louisiana) court. Id.
81. Id. at 604-05 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b)
(1971)).
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Mississippi.82 The Fifth Circuit opined that the Mississippi Supreme
Court would not have "split" the inquiry, a move that could have
allowed the Louisiana policy to govern competitive activities in
Louisiana alone.83 Instead, the Fifth Circuit held that the Mississippi
rule governed the agreement everywhere, including Louisiana,
because Louisiana did not have a "materially greater interest" in the
matter.84 As a result, protection of the parties' justified expectations,
rather than deference to the fundamental policy of a sister state,
fueled this conclusion.85 The court also advanced the debatable
contention that its unitary approach would lead to "certainty,
predictability and uniformity of result."86
i. The importance of forum (and choice of forum
clauses) to fundamental policy determinations
Herring Gas illustrates the substantial complexity-and
indeterminancy-of the public policy challenge in a negotiated
contract setting. It may also suggest the role that forum shopping
can play in the success of a public policy challenge to a choice of law
provision. Suppose the employees in Herring Gas had beaten the
employer to the courthouse and filed suit for their own declaratory
judgment (that the provision was unenforceable) in Louisiana. While
the Louisiana and Mississippi courts should, in theory, decide the
case the same way, is it really likely that a Louisiana court, applying
Louisiana conflicts principles, would have concluded that its own
statutory restrictions would have no effect on this no-compete
contract explicitly intended to operate in Louisiana?
This sort of strategic forum shopping occurred in Cherry,
Bekaert & Holland v. Brown87 and may well have been central to its
outcome. In that case, a no-compete provision was executed in
Alabama between an employee who worked there and his employer

82. Id. at 606.
83. Id. at 608.
84. Id. at 609.

85. Id. at 608-09.
86. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 6 (1971)). Whether this
last outcome will follow from this opinion is at least questionable because it underscores the role
that forum shopping might have in a case like this, a central role that can be seen in Cherry,
Bekaert & Holland v. Brown, 582 So. 2d 502 (Ala. 1991), the next case considered in the text.
87. 582 So. 2d 502.
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who had its home office in North Carolina.8" The parties agreed that
the contract was to be governed by the law of North Carolina-a
state that enforced no-compete contract provisions.89 When the
employee quit and began competing in Alabama, his former
employer brought suit in North Carolina seeking enforcement of the
provision and substantial money damages."
The employee
responded by bringing suit in Alabama seeking a declaratory
judgment that the provision was unenforceable in Alabama and by
quickly filing a motion for summary judgment on his claim.9 The
employee's case got to judgment first92 and, not surprisingly, the
Alabama courts found that the provision violated Alabama's
fundamental policy and was unenforceable there. Unlike the Herring
Gas court, the Alabama court in Cherry, Bekaert & Holland

emphasized neither the parties' expectations nor the complex
conditions found in Restatement Section 187 for recognition of
fundamental policy.93 Rather, quoting the Restatement commentary
that "[f]ulfillment of the parties' expectations is not the only value in
contract law," the court summarily concluded that Alabama law
would have applied in the absence of the agreement to North
Carolina law and that Alabama's policy was fundamental.94 Thus,
the no-compete provision was unenforceable in its entirety.95
While one could distinguish Herring Gas and Cherry, Bekaert &

88. Id. at 504.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. The employee filed his complaint with the circuit court in Alabama on May 18, 1989,
and he filed a motion for summary judgment in the North Carolina case on August 2, 1989. Id.
92. In cases such as this, where the same claim is pending in several courts, the judgment
first entered becomes res judicata between the parties and, as such, defeats the less-developed
litigation elsewhere. Id. at 505; see also Galbreath v. Scott, 433 So. 2d 454, 456 (Ala. 1983)
(quoting R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 75 (3d ed. 1977) ("The mere pendency of an
action in one state has no effect upon the right to bring an action in another. Whichever suit is
first carried to judgment then bars the other, but it is only the rendition of judgment which has
that effect. Until judgment is rendered, successive suits may be brought on the same cause of
action in a dozen different states.")).
93. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 582 So. 2d at 507-08.
94. Id. at 507 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2) cmt. g
(1989)).
95. The court also refused to enforce a no-compete provision that amounted to a liquidated
damages provision, payable if the plaintiff competed. Id. at 506. The court did not, however, go
so far as to give credence to plaintiffs position that defendants' attempt to enforce the provision
amounted to tortious interference with contract. Id. at 508.
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Holland on their facts,96 the latter underscores the likely importance
of forum in cases where a contractual choice of law is challenged as
violating the fundamental policy of a state with a competing statute.
Ideally, of course, all courts should resolve a given state's
fundamental policy questions identically, and courts of different
states ought to trust one another to appropriately apply the others'
law. But the reality is probably that, all other things being equal, a
given forum would take a more hospitable view of its own
fundamental policy than would a court in the chosen state. As
unfortunate and destabilizing as it may be to our judicial system, this
suggests that forum shopping, and the accompanying race to
judgment, becomes an important strategy for both parties to a
contract whose choice of law clause might be ripe for a fundamental
policy challenge.97
Of course, contract drafters could draft a solution to control this
risk by pairing the choice of law provision with a choice of forum
clause, thereby directing the litigation to a forum likely to uphold the
choice of law clause in the face of a fundamental policy challenge.
Because the enforceability of choice of law clauses is (at least in
practical terms) partly dependent on choice of forum, and because a
drafter will, for that reason, likely couple her choice of law clause
with a choice of forum provision, we must briefly consider the
enforceability of choice of forum provisions in order to better
understand the dynamics of choice of law clauses and the possibility
of regulating their use.
Like choice of law clauses, choice of forum clauses are, first,
contracts reflecting commitment between the parties and, second,
assertions of (collective) party autonomy vis-a-vis the judicial
system. These provisions have not received the scrutiny they
deserve under state contract law;9" rather, courts have asked under
96. Most significantly, the contract in Herring Gas Company v. Magee, 22 F.3d 603, 606
(5th Cir. 1994), was executed in the chosen state, while the contract in Cherry, Bekaert &
Holland,582 So.2d at 504, was executed in the unchosen state that eventually became the forum.
97. E.g., Custard Ins. Adjusters, Inc. v. Nardi, No. CV980061967S, 2000 WL 562318, at *1
There the employer chose Massachusetts law in its
(Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 2000).
employment agreement but sued the employee in Connecticut under a Connecticut statute. Id. at
*3. The employer succeeded in persuading the Connecticut court that Connecticut's fundamental
policy should override the plaintiff employer's own choice of Massachusetts law. Id. at *8.
98. See Woodward, supra note 16, at 19-32. Choice of forum clauses will be subject to the
same contract law challenges as choice of law clauses. Those challenges will be considered later.
See infra text accompanying notes 147-209.
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section 80 of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws99 whether
a choice of forum clause in a given case is "unfair or
unreasonable." ' Here again, conflict of laws rules are local (state
law) rules to be applied by the forum. Therefore, there is the
potential for division of opinion among jurisdictions about how the
restrictions ought to operate. Accordingly, there is a vast range of
views in the courts as to what these restrictions mean in the adhesion
contract context.
The Supreme Court's decision in Carnival Cruise Lines v.

Shute, an admiralty case where the "unfair or unreasonable"
restriction amounted to virtually no restriction at all, illustrates one
end of the spectrum. 1 ' There, the drafter embedded an adhesive
choice of forum provision somewhere in a lengthy cruise line ticket
and delivered the ticket after the plaintiff had both planned and paid
for her trip.1"2 The effect of the majority's upholding the choice of
forum clause was to drag the plaintiffs personal injury claim from
the West Coast, where she lived and bought her ticket (Washington),
where her cruise took place (California), and where her personal
injury occurred (off the coast of Mexico), to Florida where Carnival
Cruise Lines had its offices. 3 This may not have completely
destroyed the plaintiff's claim, but it surely had a very negative
influence on its settlement value.
Even harsher than Carnival Cruise Lines was America Online v.

Booker,"° where it is likely that the plaintiffs claim (and the claims
of all customers similarly situated) was completely destroyed by the
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 80 (1971) (amended 1989) ("The
parties' agreement as to the place of the action cannot oust a state of judicial jurisdiction, but such
an agreement will be given effect unless it is unfair or unreasonable.").
100. See, e.g., Calzavara v. Biehl & Co., 181 So.2d 809, 810 (4th Cir. 1966) (finding that a
provision giving an Italian court exclusive jurisdiction was unreasonable as applied to a U.S.
citizen residing in New Orleans and bringing action against Louisiana corporation); Am. Online,
Inc. v. Booker, 781 So. 2d 423, 425 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); see also discussion infra text
accompanying 147-209.
101. 499 U.S. 585, 593-95 (1991).
102. Id. at 587-88. The plaintiff purchased her ticket through a Washington State travel agent
and argued that but for her contract in Washington, she never would have purchased the ticket.
Id. Therefore, she argued, the state of Washington had a material interest in the contract since the
transaction had been completed in Washington; however, the Court noted that the tickets very
clearly called attention to the choice of law provision in the contract with capital and boldface
lettering. Id.
103. Id. at 595-96.
104. 781 So. 2d 423 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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court's enforcement of a choice of forum clause. There, the plaintiff
brought a class action in Florida to challenge America Online's
practice of charging customers for the time they spent viewing
unwanted pop-up ads.' °5 America Online moved to dismiss based on
a choice of Virginia forum clause. 0 6 The plaintiff, in turn,
challenged the choice of forum provision as being "unreasonable or
unjust" because (while it was not, of course, mentioned in the choice
of Virginia law clause itself) Virginia had no class action procedure;
thus, litigation in Virginia would deny plaintiffs any class remedy.0 7
Despite the mass-market, adhesive nature of the contract, the court
concluded that the absence of a class action remedy in Virginia was
not enough to render the clause "unreasonable or unjust" and
dismissed the Florida class action.0 8 But the obviously nonnegotiated nature of the transaction did not keep the court from
adding the rhetorical flourish that "the forum selection provision was
obtained through a freely negotiated agreement which has not been
shown by the plaintiffs to be either unreasonable or unjust."'0 9 It is

hard to imagine how (except in theory) an individual with a tiny
claim of the kind held by the plaintiff in America Online could have
any legal remedy at all, if getting that relief also required a trip from
Florida to Virginia." 0
Carnival Cruise Lines and America Online v. Booker illustrate a

common phenomenon in the cases where courts enforce choice of
forum clauses found in adhesion contracts: courts assume that
customers freely contract for a particular forum and then use that
assumption to add makeweight to the conclusion that the choice of
forum provision is not "unfair or unreasonable." The majority in
Carnival Cruise Lines, for example, seized on a concession of the
plaintiff's lawyer to get beyond the contract issues."' Similarly, the
105. Id. at 424.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 424-25. The plaintiffs complained that their only recourse was "to litigate
individual cases in Virginia small claims court, and that to do so would be economically
impractical." Id.
108. Id. at 425.
109. Id.
110. For an example of a court that understands this difficulty, see Aral v. Earthlink,Inc., 36
Cal. Rptr. 3d 229, 231 (Ct. App. 2005) ("A forum selection clause that discourages legitimate
claims by imposing unreasonable geographical barriers is unenforceable under well-settled
California law.").
111. Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991) ("[R]espondents have
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America Online court apparently applied conflict of laws principles
to what it assumed was an enforceable contract under applicable
contract law. Because enforceable contracts were assumed in both of

these cases, it seems likely that neither of these cases (nor many
cases like them)" 2 says much, if anything, about the contract law
3
defenses to choice of forum contracts." 1
Because restrictions on choice of forum clauses are local
restrictions, Carnival Cruise Lines need not be followed in nonadmiralty cases and America Online states only the Florida rule." 4

As with choice of law, state diversity in the conflicts restrictions on
choice of forum clauses invites forum shopping, parallel litigation,
and races to judgment as seen in Cherry, Bekaert & Holland

discussed above." 5 As that case might suggest, obtaining a favorable
ruling (one way or the other) on a contractual choice of law provision
may be forum-dependent. But the same is obviously true of the
enforceability of a choice of forum provision itself, whether it is
designed to send the contract litigation to a place that will embrace

more favorable law for the drafter," 6 or merely to convenience the
drafter (or to inconvenience the customer)." 7

Because of the

conceded that they were given notice of the forum provision and, therefore, presumably retained
the option of rejecting the contract with impunity."). But see id.at 597-605 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (dwelling on the contract issues and focusing on the implications of standard forms,
the inability to bargain, and the like-concerns of contract law).
112. The exception is cases where the "forum" chosen is arbitration. In that instance, the
Federal Arbitration Act, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, eliminates the conflict of laws
restrictions on choosing fora by contract. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681,
686-87 (1996). This leaves only contract law challenges to arbitration clauses; accordingly, in
that area the contract challenges are well-developed in the case law. See, e.g., May v. Higbee
Co., 372 F.3d 757, 763-64 (5th Cir. 2004) (stating that "arbitration is a matter of contract" and
state contract law will determine whether a valid agreement to arbitrate was formed).
113. This tendency to assume a fully-formed contract is, perhaps, helped along by the Second
Restatement of Conflict of Laws' formulations that apply to contracts for forum, that is, to
collective assertions of party power to choose a different court and thereby effectively foreclose
the exercise ofjurisdiction by the (unchosen) forum. The assumption that there is an enforceable
underlying contract for forum often goes unchallenged under contract principles; the parties
instead typically argue about the meaning of the vague general standard in the Second
Restatement of Conflict of Laws.
114. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 48, § 11.5.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 87-95.
116. See, e.g., Herring Gas Co. v. Magee, 22 F.3d 603, 607 (5th Cir. 1994); Cherry, Bekaert
& Holland v. Brown, 582 So. 2d 502, 507 (Ala. 1991); Am. Online, Inc. v. Booker, 781 So. 2d
423, 425 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
117. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593-94 (1991); Kubis &
Perszyk Assocs., Inc. v. Sun Microsys., Inc., 680 A.2d 618, 627 (N.J. 1996). In Kubis & Perszyk
Assocs., the court noted:
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consequences above, choice of law and choice of forum often come
in pairs.
ii. The (growing) importance of fundamental
policy to choice of forum provisions
The New Jersey Supreme Court may be staking out a position
on the other end of the spectrum from Carnival Cruise Lines in its
interpretation of the appropriate limitations on choice of forum
clauses in adhesion contracts. In Kubis & Perszyk Associates, Inc. v.
Sun Microsystems, Inc.," 8 Kubis & Perzyk Associates sued Sun
Microsystems for terminating their relationship in violation of the
New Jersey Franchise Practices Act," 9 a statute the New Jersey
Supreme Court had earlier concluded reflected "fundamental policy"
of New Jersey. 2° The contract in question provided that California
law applied to the contract and chose courts in California as the
exclusive fora for litigating disputes. 2 ' Sun Microsystems, the
California defendant, contended that under the choice of California
law provision in the contract, the relationship was not subject to the
New Jersey Franchise Practices Act and, in any event, moved to
dismiss on the basis of the choice of forum clause.' 22
The New Jersey Appellate Division took the very unusual step
of making its dismissal of the plaintiff's case conditional on the
California court's applying New Jersey law to the problem, if it
involved a franchise covered by the New Jersey statute.'2 3 Over a
In [a standard form contract] setting, a franchisor has little to lose by including a
forum-selection clause in its standard agreement. Although such a clause directly
benefits the franchisor by requiring suit to be filed in a geographically convenient state
of choice where it can be defended by the franchisor's regular litigation counsel, the
indirect benefit to franchisors is to make litigation more costly and cumbersome for
economically weaker franchisees that often lack the sophistication and resources to
litigate effectively a long distance from home.
Id.
118. 680A.2d618 (N.J. 1996).
119. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:10-1 to -15 (West 2001 & Supp. 2006).
120. Kubis & PerszykAssocs., 680 A.2d at 618.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 620.
123. New Jersey had clear precedent that its franchise law reflected its own "fundamental
policy." Instructional Sys., Inc. v. Computer Curriculum Corp., 614 A.2d 124, 133, 135 (N.J.
1992). This meant that a California court would have had authority, from the New Jersey
Supreme Court, that New Jersey's franchise law reflected New Jersey's "fundamental policy."
But California courts could apply whatever law its own conflict rules call for, and given the
choice of law provision and Sun Microsystems' location in California, those rules might well not
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dissent, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the
choice of forum provision was, in these circumstances,
unenforceable.' 24 Rejecting any suggestion that its decision was
parochial, 5 the court based its decision largely on the financial
difficulties that the choice of forum clause presented to vindication
of the plaintiffs rights under the statute'26 and on the substantial
likelihood that the provision was adhesive.2 7 In concluding, the
court stated a rule for enforceability of choice of forum clauses in
franchise contracts:
Accordingly, we hold that forum-selection clauses in
franchise agreements are presumptively invalid, and should
not be enforced unless the franchisor can satisfy the burden
of proving that such a clause was not imposed on the
franchisee unfairly on the basis of its superior bargaining
position. Evidence that the forum-selection clause was
included as part of the standard franchise agreement,
without more, is insufficient to overcome the presumption
of invalidity.' 8
Kubis & Perszyk Associates reflects the complex
interrelationship of law and forum. The determination that the
franchisee protection offered by New Jersey's statute reflected New

select New Jersey law in this instance. See also Herring Gas Co. v. Magee, 22 F.3d 603, 609 (5th
Cir. 1994) (upholding Mississippi's choice of law clause and concluding that Louisiana did not
have a materially greater interest in the law's enforcement); supra text accompanying notes 7786. The appellate division's decision underscores the fact that the New Jersey court's view of its
own policy was not binding on California courts. Those courts were free to conclude otherwise;
that is, they could conclude, as the court did in Herring Gas, that New Jersey did not have a
materially greater interest than California in enforcement. They could also (at least in theory) use
an entirely different choice of law rule that did not recognize New Jersey's fundamental policy at
all.
That the appellate division conditioned its dismissal on California's use of New Jersey
law reflects less than full confidence in another state's respect for a sister state's policy. And
while the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that "parochialism play[ed] no role in [its] decision,"
Kubis & Perszyk Assocs., 680 A.2d at 628, the majority's decision may reflect even less
confidence in the California courts than did the appellate division's since the effect of the
supreme court decision was to deny any role whatsoever to the California courts.
124. Kubis & PerzykAssocs., 680 A.2d at 628.
125. Id.; see also supra note 123.
126. Kubis & Perzvk Assocs. 680 A.2d at 628.
127. Id. But see id. at 631-32 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (arguing that, by outlawing choice of
forum clauses in car dealer franchise agreements, the legislature meant to leave those in non-car
dealer franchise agreements enforceable).
128. Id. at 627.
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Jersey's "fundamental policy" prompted the court both to expect
California courts to implement New Jersey's policy (and the
appellate division to condition its dismissal on assurance that this
would happen) and to view the plaintiffs travel to a distant forum as
particularly burdensome. 29 An obvious byproduct of the decision
was that a New Jersey court (and not a California court) would be
implementing New Jersey's fundamental policy. It would be doing
so partly because the very expense incident to litigation in a distant
forum offended the legal protection offered by its franchise law.
Fundamental state policy also fueled the decision in Param
Petroleum Corporation v. Commerce and Industry Insurance
Company.130 The contract in Param Petroleum was a commercial
insurance contract covering pollution risk from the insured's
underground gasoline storage tanks located in New Jersey.'31 The
contract chose New York law and specified that litigation had to be
conducted in New York where the insurance company was located.132
In voiding the choice of forum provision, the ParamPetroleum court
went further than the Kubis & Perszyk Associates court. Because the
interests of third parties were potentially implicated, the court
seemed to foreclose the possibility that the insurance company could
ever establish enforceability on the basis that "such a clause was not
imposed on the franchisee unfairly on the basis of its superior
bargaining position." '33 The court said:
[W]e do not mean to imply that the [Kubis & Perszyk
Associates] approach should be taken in the area of
insurance. For as the Court noted in [Howell v. Rosecliff
Realty Co.] the legitimate concerns of the State go beyond
mere protection of the insured to protection for those
claimants who may have suffered damages as a result of
covered risks. Thus, at least when dealing with risks
located wholly within this State, we are of the view that the
parties to the insurance contract should not be permitted to
negotiate away the protection of our courts, protection
129. Id.
130. 686 A.2d 377 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997).
131. Id. at 378.
132. Id. at 377.
133. Id. at 381 (quoting Kubis & Perszyk Assocs., 680 A.2d at 627); see also supra text
accompanying note 128.
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which is intended for the insured, the insurance company,
who may suffer damages as a result of an
and for those
31 4
risk.
insured
The Kubis & Persyk Associates court avoided the adhesive
choice of forum provision because important forum state public
policy was implicated and because travel to California would itself
have undercut the policies embraced by the state's franchise law.
One could easily bring this variant of the conflicts analysis to a
choice of law provision that attempts to replace the "unchosen"
state's unconscionability precedents with those of the "chosen" state.
Unconscionability precedents are often heralded as a primary form of
protection from abusive contracts and form core, fundamental
limitations on contracting in state contract law.'35 The challenge to
the choice of (different) law clause would maintain that
unconscionability precedents reflect the forum state's most
fundamental policy in consumer cases, and that under the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws formulation, they thereby
override a contrary choice of law in an adhesion contract. 36 In
134. Param Petroleum, 686 A.2d at 381 (citing Howell v. Rosecliff Realty, Co., 245 A.2d
318, 325-26 (N.J. 1968) (citation omitted)); see also Haisten v. Grass Valley Med.
Reimbursement Fund, Ltd., 784 F.2d 1392, 1406-07 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding a choice of Cayman
Islands law provision in a medical malpractice insurance contract unenforceable in California).
135. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard Form Contractingin the
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 456-58 (2002); Erin Ann O'Hara, Choice of Law for
Internet Transactions: The Uneasy Case for Online Consumer Protection, 153 U. PA. L. REV.
1883, 1918 (2005); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The
Return of UnconscionabilityAnalysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST.
J. ON DisP. RESOL. 757, 794-95 (2004); cf Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to
Arbitration: Unconscionability and Agreements to Arbitrate 31-32 (ExpressO Preprint Series,
Working Paper No. 1375, 2006), available at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
6130&context=expresso (noting that while unconscionability is rarely applied outside of
arbitration agreements, courts are empowered to strike any unconscionable term). But see Robert
L. Oakley, Fairness in Electronic Contracting: Minimum Standards for Non-Negotiated
Contracts, 42 Hous. L. REV. 1041, 1064 (2005) (arguing that unconscionability provides
insufficient protection for consumers in the electronic contracting context).
136. Unless the court engages in an analysis not dependent on the complex formulation in the
Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws, the consumer will have to address the two other
conditions advanced by Section 187(2): that the interests of the forum are materially greater than
those of the chosen state and that the forum state's law would apply in the absence of the choice
of law provision. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2) (1989). For the
full quotation, see supra text accompanying note 21. In so doing, the consumer also will have to
overcome such drafting tricks as a clause stating that it was "the parties' agreement" and that the
contract was made in the chosen state. For the credit card contract language, see infra note 139
and accompanying text. A direct unconscionability attack on the choice of law provision using
contract law may avoid the presumptions that the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
erects. See infra note 184 and accompanying text.
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addition, a choice of forum provision that purported to transplant the
litigation from state A to state B where travel to B would undercut
A's unconscionability protection might be successfully challenged as
"unfair or unreasonable," as it was in Kubis.
2. Limits Based in Contract Law
The limitations discussed above proceed from a conflict of laws
analysis and limit the power of the parties, acting collectively, to
alter the conflict of laws rules a forum would ordinarily apply. The
question whether the parties are acting collectively (that is, whether
they have a contract to use a designated law or forum) logically
precedes the conflicts question whether given such an agreement, the
forum should enforce it. Once the contract at the base of choice of
law clauses is disentangled from the conflict of laws principles,
contract law can be brought to bear on it. Which contract law will be
applied, as suggested earlier, is debatable.137 Probably the best
approach looks to the forum state's contract law, at least in cases
where the forum jurisdiction has a substantial relationship with the
parties or their contract. This threshold conflicts question matters
because states have diverse views about adhesion contracts. If the
applicable contract law will be that of the forum, it is obvious that
there will be forum shopping incentives and that form drafters will
probably try to limit forum shopping through choice of forum
clauses. But the choice of forum clauses are contract provisions, and
the same contract law analysis also must be brought to bear on them.
Once we have identified the appropriate contract law, a good
place to begin is with the contract law that governs the formation of
agreements in the adhesion contract setting. Given the assent issues
raised by adhesion contracts generally, the law of contract formation
has promise in limiting both choice of law and choice of forum
clauses.
In the case of choice of law clauses (and to a somewhat lesser
extent with choice of forum clauses), there is a central issue that may
underscore the limitations in the true assent model 38 of contract law
itself: there is good reason to doubt the existence of "assent" in any
but the most formalistic sense, even in settings where the form's
137. See supra text accompanying note 22.
138. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 20, 201 (1989).
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recipient is reasonably sophisticated. Even if customers read the
forms-most do not and businesses writing forms know that they do
not-customers would have no idea what the implications (intended
or otherwise) of a choice of law clause would be. "Disclosure"
would not be a solution: we could require specific "notice," or even
that the provision be read aloud to the customer, and it still would not
matter. Why, other than settling on some law, does a vendor select
the particular law it selected? What, for example, is the significance
to a customer of a "bill stuffer" stating, "This Agreement is made in
Delaware. It is governed by the laws of the State of Delaware,
without regard to its conflicts of laws principles, and by any
applicable federal laws." '39

Would a product cloaked in Delaware law be, for that reason,
more (or less) valuable than a product packaged in Pennsylvania's or
California's law? 4 ° It is extremely far-fetched to believe that any
consumer or small business customer can discriminate among
products using choice of law clauses. Even on an economics model
predicated more on product selection than real agreement, 4 ' choice
of law clauses probably fail the test of contractual assent. While real,
meaningful disclosure might work in theory with choice of forum
clauses,'42 many have suggested that the rationality that is assumed
when a customer "knowingly" agrees to a dispute resolution process
that might never be called into play is simply not present.'43 The idea
139. Edelist v. MBNA Am. Bank, 790 A.2d 1249, 1252 (Del. Super. Ct. 2001). Note the
drafters' effort to manipulate the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws Section 188 factors.
If a contract is "made" in Delaware, then Delaware has more "contact" with it than it otherwise
would. But where a contract is "made" is normally a question for the court in applying its
conflict of laws principles. Where the contract is "made" and where the drafter says it is "made"
can be two different places; only the first has relevance under a Section 188 analysis.
140. It would not be impossible for vendors to actually compete for customers through use of
choice of law clauses. Imagine the marketing possibilities: "We choose X law, widely regarded
as most protective of consumers because our products are the best. They choose Y law to shield
their low quality. Buy our products with confidence!"
Using legal terms as sales tools has not made its arrival yet, but the reverse may have
begun. A group of consumer groups that opposes arbitration provisions has begun to sensitize its
website visitors to the implications of those terms, urging visitors not to patronize vendors that
include such terms in their forms. See Give Me Back My Rights Coalition, http://www
.givemebackmyrights.com! (last visited Sept. 4, 2006).
141. Cf Radin, supra note 49 (distinguishing between two models of contract, contract-asconsent and contract-as-product, in light of the trend of online commerce).
142. The majority in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute seemed to believe that disclosure
was important to its decision. See 499 U.S. 585, 590 (1991).
143. Customers might understand they have to travel to Florida to pursue a claim, but unless
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that Ms. Shute could have rejected her cruise had she simply read the
fine print in the ticket seemed to animate the majority in Carnival
Cruise Lines.'
If we connect "assent" to the economic premises
behind it,' 45 it begs the question whether she could have rationally
assessed the "value" of that provision in her contract had she read it.
If contract law will be brought to bear on choice of law clauses,
the problem is that the absence of meaningful assent logically leads
to a broadside on choice of law clauses in consumer and small
business contracts. In any adhesive contract setting, sophisticated
and unsophisticated persons alike will have no true assent to a
drafter's choice of law clause even if disclosure of the provisions is
mandatory. Moreover, we have by now a strong record of enforcing
these clauses except in narrow (conflict of laws) circumstances
because they are commercially important.'46 Looking too hard at the
question of adhesive assent threatens to bring down the beneficial
uses of choice of law clauses along with the bad uses, and it is
extremely unlikely that any court would be so inclined. Thus, an
attack based on lack of assent to a choice of law must be far more
individualized and specific.

they are sophisticated, they might not know that this was not the "rule" anyway. See generally
Lee Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice of Forum Clauses
in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 700 (1992) (arguing that choice of forum
clauses in standard form contracts should be deemed per se invalid). Additionally, research is
suggesting that the underlying assumptions about customer rationality in many contract matters
are false. Larry T. Garvin, Small Business and the False Dichotomies of Contract Law, 40 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 295, 296-97 (2005); see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition
and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 244 (1995) (noting that consumers are only
concerned with the bottom line, not necessarily how the company gets there and what legal
corners they must cut). A recent Canadian proposal for a model law on jurisdiction and conflict
of laws rules for consumer contracts justifies limitations on choice of forum clauses in consumer
contracts because it "is considered unlikely that most consumers would turn their minds to a
choice of forum clause at the time of contracting." Organization of American States (OAS),
Description of Canada's Proposal on the Development of a Model Law on Jurisdiction and
Conflict of Laws Rules for Consumer Contracts in the Context of the Seventh Inter-American
Specialized Conference on Private International Law (CIDIP-VII) at 3, http://scm.oas.org/
doc.public/English/hist_06/CP 15642E04.doc.
144. Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 590.
145. See William J. Woodward, Jr., "Sale" of Law and Forum and the Widening Gulf
Between "Consumer" and "Nonconsumer" Contracts in the UCC, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 243, 27273 (1997) (arguing that the theory that purchasers have selected the law of a transaction fails
because of asymmetry in information).
146. Woodward, supra note 16, at 20-21.
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a. Contractformation in mandatory arbitrationcases: a case study
The best examples of contract formation doctrine in action in
this context are found in cases challenging mandatory arbitration
clauses. These clauses form a subset of choice of forum clauses,
directing the parties to a particular kind of forum, often in a
particular place, for their dispute resolution.'47 As interpreted by the
Supreme Court in a series of cases in the 1980's and 1990's, the
Federal Arbitration Act has eliminated all challenges to arbitration
clauses except those founded in contract law.'48 The result is that the
arbitration cases are clearly contract law cases, not some confusing
combination of contract and conflicts principles.
Here, there is a wide range of views as well. One end of the
spectrum is anchored by the routinely criticized Hill v. Gateway
2000, Inc.149 That case focused on the contract question whether an
arbitration provision became binding when it was supplied on a form
the seller packed into the box containing the computer and packing
material. 50 The arbitration agreement (and presumably the entire
sales contract) formed, said Judge Easterbrook, when the buyer
failed to pack up and ship the computer back to Gateway within the
thirty day time limit Gateway specified in the form that contained the

147. See Consumer and Media Alert: The Small Print That's Devastating Major Consumer
Rights, http://www.consumerlaw.org/initiatives/model/arbitration.shtml (last visited Sept. 27,
2006).
148. See, e.g., Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 679, 686 (1996). But see Perry v.
Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 n.9 (1987).
149. 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997). For examples of critics, see Batya Goodman, Honey, I
Shrink-Wrapped the Consumer: The Shrink-Wrap Agreement as an Adhesion Contract, 21
CARDOZO L. REv. 319, 351-52 (1999) (criticizing the Hill court for considering provisions of the
UCC rather than applying principles of adhesion contracts); Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts
Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 774-75 & n.50
(2002) (noting that the court found that a consumer assented to terms added after the purchase
was made); Thomas J. McCarthy et al., Sales, 53 Bus. LAW. 1461, 1464-67 (1998) (discussing
the Hill court's failure to apply U.C.C. Section 2-207 even though the first official comment was
specifically applicable); Jeremy Senderowicz, ConsumerArbitration and Freedom of Contract:A
Proposalto FacilitateConsumers' Informed Consent to Arbitration Clauses in Form Contracts,
32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 275, 296-99 (1999) (discussing the problems that arise when
courts, in cases like Hill, fail to address consumer consent to arbitration clauses); Jean R.
Stemlight, Gateway Widens Doorway to Imposing Unfair Binding Arbitration on Consumers,
FLA. B.J., Nov. 1997, at 8, 10-12, available at http://www.floridabar.org/DVCOM/JN/
JNJournal01 .nsf/76d28aa8f2ee03e 185256aa9005d8d9a/a96947ff647f657085256adb005d6181 ?O
penDocument (arguing that the outcome of Hill is questionable based on contract law and on
federal statutory, constitutional, and common law grounds).
150. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148.
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contract terms.'
It is unclear which state's law the federal court in
Hill used to decide the case; Judge Easterbrook took the position that
it did not matter. 152 But it does matter: if a different judge were to
decide essentially the same case
under Kansas or Missouri law, the
53
1
outcome would be different.

When dealing with "browseware"'' 4 instead of forms-sealed-ina-box, Specht v. Netscape Communications, Corp.'55 tends to go in
the other direction from Hill.'56 This was another case challenging
the binding force of an arbitration provision, but this time, the
provision was promulgated by the vendor through a web site's
browseware.' 57 Using California contract law, the court found the
provision unenforceable. 58 In Badie v. Bank of America, 5' another
skeptical court found that an arbitration clause, promulgated by the
bank via a "bill stuffer"'6 ° long after the bank-customer relationship
had formed, was not binding as a matter of California contract law.'6 '
While vendors might attempt to alter such results by bundling
the arbitration clause with a choice of (different) law clause (and
given the diversity in state views, it is obvious why they would

151. Id. at 1150.
152. Id. at 1149. Judge Easterbrook "applie[d]" the law of ProCD Inc., v. Zeidenberg, 86
F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996), a case he had earlier decided under the law of Wisconsin. Id. at
1149; see also supra note 11.
153. For example, in Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1136-37 (D. Kan.
2000), the federal court explicitly focused on the applicable state's U.C.C. precedent and
concluded that Gateway's form was likely not binding as a matter of contract law.
154. "Browseware" refers to plug-in software used to enhance the functioning of a user's
browser program to download certain files. Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns, Corp., 306 F.3d 17,
19 (2d Cir. 2002).
155. 306 F.3d 17.
156. Id. at 35 ("Reasonably conspicuous notice of the existence of contract terms and
unambiguous manifestation of assent to those terms by consumers are essential if electronic
bargaining is to have integrity and credibility."); see also Juliet M. Moringiello & William L.
Reynolds, Survey of the Law of Cyberspace: Internet Contracting Cases 2004-2005, 61 BUS.
LAW. 433, 434-36 (2005) (analyzing the holdings and impact of Specht and Register corn, Inc. v.
Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004)); cf Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 40102 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding that through repeated visits to Register.com, Verio had knowledge of
the terms demanded).
157. Specht, 306 F.3d at 20.
158. Id. at 27, 38.
159. 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273 (Ct. App. 1998).
160. "Bill stuffer" refers to an insert the bank sent to its customers with their monthly account
statements. Id. at 275.
161. Id. at291.
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try), 162 approaches such as these remain viable as common law

contract tools to challenge the binding force of both choice of law
clauses (that the vendor will insert in an attempt to avoid results like
Specht and Badie) and choice of forum clauses (through which
vendors will attempt to transport the litigation to a more favorable
forum) as new forms of contracting develop.
When the choice of forum provision is an arbitration clause
covered by the Federal Arbitration Act, challenges to the binding
force of the provision itself are, apparently, the only challenges
courts may hear when an arbitration provision appears in an adhesion
contract. In its latest foray into this area, the Supreme Court in
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., v. Cardegna63 held that, unless the
challenge were to the binding effect of the arbitration provision
itself, the claim that the overall contract is not valid is for the
arbitrator to decide. 1" One effect we can expect from Buckeye is that
litigants will more directly focus on the binding effect of the
arbitration provision itself as a matter of contract law.'65
b. Challenginglack of assent under
the reasonableexpectations doctrine
Yet another way to articulate an assent-based challenge to a
choice of law or forum clause comes from the "reasonable
expectations" doctrines. A relatively narrow version of this idea is
captured by Section 211(3) of the Second Restatement of
Contracts. 6 6 After generally validating standard form contracts, the
162. Badie underscores the importance of the threshold conflict of laws question that precedes
a contract analysis: if Delaware law controlled the very same contract formation question, the
arbitration clause (or, by analogy, a choice of forum clause) would be binding. See id.; Edelist v.
MBNA Am. Bank, 720 A.2d 1249, 1255 (Del. Super. Ct. 2001); see also supra note 29.
163. 126 S. Ct. 1204 (2006).
164. Id. at 1209 ("[Ulnless the challenge is to the arbitration clause itself, the issue of the
contract's validity is considered by the arbitrator in the first instance." (citing Prima Paint Corp.
v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967))).
165. Winig v. Cingular Wireless, No. C064297 MMC, 2006 WL 2766007 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
27, 2006), was such a case, decided after Buckeye. The court in Winig concluded that the
arbitration provision was unconscionable and unenforceable under settled California contract law
because it included a class action waiver. Id. at *5. Buckeye was nowhere found in the opinion.
One can infer that because the attack was on the binding nature of the arbitration provision itself,
Buckeye was not a bar. Many of the other California cases holding arbitration provisions
containing class action waivers to be unconscionable are similar to Winig.
166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1979). The entire provision reads:
§ 211. Standardized Agreements
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provision attempts to remove from the contract those clauses that a
reasonable recipient would not expect, given the form.' 67 Section
211(3) is a particular manifestation of the general assent rules stated
in Sections 20 and 201 of the Second Restatement of Contracts.168
Those rules generally provide that if a contracting party knows or has
reason to know that the second party is mistaken or intends
something different from the intent of the first party, then the first
party's intent will not be binding on the second party.'69 While the
more specific articulation of these ideas in the form contract
provision has been castigated by some commentators 7 ° and was
eventually dropped by the UCC Article 2 Drafting Committee, 7 ' the

(I) Except as stated in Subsection (3), where a party to an agreement signs or otherwise
manifests assent to a writing and has reason to believe that like writings are regularly
used to embody terms of agreements of the same type, he adopts the writing as an
integrated agreement with respect to the terms included in the writing.
(2) Such a writing is interpreted wherever reasonable as treating alike all those
similarly situated, without regard to their knowledge or understanding of the standard
terms of the writing.
(3) Where the other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent
would not do so if he knew that the writing contained a particular term, the term is not
part of the agreement.
Id. § 211.
Article 2.1.20 of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts is not
nearly as narrow as Section 211(3) of the Second Restatement of Contracts. Article 2.1.20
provides:
(Surprising terms)
(1) No term contained in standard terms which is of such a character that the other
party could not reasonably have expected it, is effective unless it has been expressly
accepted by that party.
(2) In determining whether a term is of such a character regard shall be had to its
content, language and presentation.
UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 2004, art. 2.1.20,
available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/backetter2004
.pdf.
167. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3).
168. Id. §211cmt. f.
169. Id. §§ 20, 201.
170. See, e.g., Eric Mills Holmes & Dagmar Thiirmann, A New and Old Theory for
AdjudicatingStandardized Contracts, 17 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 323, 399 (1987) (criticizing the
Second RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS for not supplying guidelines for how to deal with assent);
James J. White, Form Contracts Under Revised Article 2, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 315, 325 (1997)
(describing the Restatement Section 211(3) as "obscure").
171. See Jennifer S. Martin, An Emerging Worldwide Standardfor Protectionsof Consumers
in the Sale of Goods: Did We Miss an Opportunity with Revised UCC Article 2, 41 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 223, 234-39 (2006) (discussing the major differences between the 1999 draft and the
approved version); cf White, supra note 170, at 335-56 (arguing against the addition of Section
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ideas behind it might yet find utility with choice of law clauses as it
has with provisions in insurance contracts.
Once again, it is important to recall that choice of law clauses
are thought to bring substantial economic value through increased
legal certainty.' This means that courts will have difficulty creating
a judicial precedent that will broadly threaten large numbers of these
clauses. Thus, a strategy that may show promise is a focus not on the
choice of law or forum clause itself, but on its legal implications in
an adhesion contract. For example, a promulgator of a clause
specifying Virginia as the forum might (conceivably) expect a kind
of assent from the customer to the economic implications of traveling
a distance in order to bring or defend claims; however, it seems
extremely doubtful that the drafter could imagine that the customer
reasonably expects to lose her right to bring a class action via that
clause.'
That a drafter could, it would seem, easily reduce the odds
of a successful Section 211(3) attack by "disclosure"-simply stating
in the form that "Virginia has no class action device"-suggests one
limit to a "reasonable expectations" approach in the choice of forum
area. 174

But the lack of limits to the imaginative application of Section
211(3)-the central weakness of the provision in the eyes of
critics' 75-is a potentially more serious problem. This critique of the
provision is readily apparent when we bring the Restatement's
particular expression of the "reasonable expectations" idea to bear on
choice of law clauses.
Virtually everything that would matter to a customer is "hidden"
in a choice of law clause. How would a California resident know
that Delaware law validates "bill stuffers" (and California law does

2-206, a "reasonable expectations" section, which is currently not a part of the revised UCC).
172. See supra note 46.
173. For a case where these unforeseen circumstances did occur, see Am. Online, Inc. v.
Booker, 781 So. 2d 423, 425 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that choice of Virginia forum
clause was not unconscionable even though Virginia law does not allow class actions and Florida
law does).
174. See Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionabilityand the Crowd-Consumers and the Common
Law Tradition, 31 U. PITT. L. REv. 349, 354-56 (1969) (suggesting that in order to distinguish a
case from Williams v. Walker-Thomas FurnitureCo., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) and a finding
that the agreement is unconscionable, a seller need only "make the clause clearer").
175. E.g., White, supra note 170, at 324-25 (noting that Section 211(3) has been interpreted
in only forty-three cases during the first fifteen years of existence).
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not)?'76 Or that by "agreeing" that Utah law controls, the customer is
probably giving up her right to challenge a class action waiver?' 77 In
any setting where the choice of law clause produced negative results
that would not have been anticipated by the customer, one could
plausibly argue that the drafter could not have reasonably believed
that the customer would agree to the choice of law, if that is what it
meant. Because there are no standards for application of Section
211(3) of the Second Restatement of Contracts in this context, its use
would, no doubt, attract damning criticism.
Nonetheless, a successful, pointed attack of this kind might well
yield a sound policy result. Such an approach to Section 211(3) in
this context leads to general enforcement of the choice of law clause,
except to the extent that it adversely affects the protection that a
consumer or small business would have from the legal regime that
would be in effect absent the choice of law clause. While most
customers have few expectations about the applicable law, they
probably do "reasonably expect" that if they live in a given state, that
the state's law will govern them and, to the extent that their local law
offers protection, that it will protect them.'
Indeed, prior to the
developments revealed in the recent cases where courts reasoned that
adhesive choice of law provisions effectively displaced otherwise
applicable consumer law,'79 many observers probably would have
thought that the law was generally in accord with the above analysis.
A complicated-though far narrower-version of this same approach
even made its way into the revision of the UCC Section 1-105 (later
renumbered § 1-301), the UCC's contractual choice of law rule.5 °

176. Delaware makes "bill stuffers" binding as a matter of Delaware contract law by
legislation. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 952(a) (2001) ("Any notice of an amendment sent
by the bank may be included in the same envelope with a periodic statement or as part of the
periodic statement or in other materials sent to the borrower."), with Badie v. Bank of Am., 79
Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 291 (Ct. App. 1998) (finding that a "bill stuffer," sent long after a banking
relationship has formed, was not binding as a matter of law in California). For a discussion of
Badie, see supra notes 159-162 and accompanying text.
177. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 70C-3-104, 70C-4-105 (2001 & Supp. 2006).
178. See Woodward, supra note 145, at 264-65 (noting "consumers in fact do not pay
attention to the small print they find in boilerplate contracts, and consumers have relatively
limited access to legal resources").
179. See, e.g., Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1117 (Cal. 2005).
180. See U.C.C. § 1-301(e) (2003); infra note 223 and accompanying text.
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c. Challengingchoice of law provisions as unconscionable

A broad attack on a choice of law or choice of forum clause
based on unconscionability and related doctrines will be limited in its

effectiveness by the same concerns.

Unconscionability has often

been divided into "procedural" and "substantive" components, 8 ' and
state law sometimes requires both.'82 Lack of assent to either a
choice of law or a choice of forum clause could easily be framed in

unconscionability rhetoric-promulgated terms buried in small print,
incomprehensible to lay people, unfair in impact, etc.'83 Such
challenges could be made against virtually all choice of law and most
choice of forum clauses in adhesion contracts. But the perceived
economic value of these provisions, and the economic implications
of creating a precedent that would invalidate all or most of them,
virtually assures us that such a broad challenge will not succeed.
These economic considerations may explain why we have not seen
direct challenges to choice of law or forum clauses by advocates
using the contract law-based tools of unconscionability.
For choice of law provisions, there might be substantial
advantage to an unconscionability approach if a successful one could
be constructed.'8 4 As discussed earlier,'8 5 conflict of laws doctrine
181. See, e.g., Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 135, at 456-57.
182. California law requires an unconscionability attack to have both substantive and
procedural elements. Substantive unconscionability looks at the actual contract terms, where as
procedural unconscionability focuses on any disparity in bargaining power between the parties.
See Wayne v. Staples, Inc., 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 544, 554 (Ct. App. 2006); Klussman v. Cross
Country Bank, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 728, 737 & n.12 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Szetela v. Discover
Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867 (Ct. App. 2002)). Other state courts have held that
unconscionability claims must contain both substantive and procedural elements. See, e.g.,
Zobrist v. Verizon Wireless, 822 N.E.2d 531, 540 (I11.App. Ct. 2004); Brower v. Gateway 2000,
Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 573 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); see also Arthur Allen Leff,
Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 488
(1967) (examining the history of drafting UCC Section 2-302 on unconscionability).
183. While the choice of forum cases demonstrate a substantial overlap between the contract
law limitations, articulated through unconscionability, and the conflict of laws refusal to enforce
provisions that are "unfair or unreasonable," contract law and conflict of laws doctrines have
different legal sources and, potentially, different policy determinants. To maximize imaginative
thinking about the binding force of choice of forum clauses, it is useful to keep Step 2 (contract
law analysis) and Step 3 ("unfair or unreasonable" conflict of laws analysis) separate. For a
discussion of the three-step analysis, see supra Part II.
184. The conflict of laws limitations on choice of forum clauses-that they are not
enforceable if "unfair or unreasonable" (see supra note 99)--are quite similar to those that
contract unconscionability would impose. The effects (and intent) of a choice of forum provision
are discernable by customers, and if the effect of a choice of forum provision is to deprive the
plaintiff of her claim, a court may find the provision unenforceable. See, e.g., Discover Bank v.
Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1107 (Cal. 2005) (noting that a provision that purports to waive
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takes choice of law provisions, assumes that they are valid
contractually, and then subjects them to the complex "fundamental
policy" analysis found in the Second Restatement of Conflict of
Laws. But because, eventually, the court must consider whether the
unchosen state has a "materially greater interest" in the outcome and
' the analysis
conclude that the competing policy is "fundamental,"186
may give such adhesive choice of law clauses a presumption of
greater validity than they deserve in this particular context. This
inertia that the Second Restatement of Conflicts of Law attaches to a
choice of law provision is directly related to the assumption that the
parties agreed, in more than a strictly formal sense, to the chosen
law. As suggested here, that is a false assumption in the adhesion
contract setting."s7 Thus, it is inappropriate in this setting to allow a
choice of law clause in an adhesion contract to insulate another
provision in the contract from an unconscionability attack under
normally applicable law.
Vendors' efforts to displace the "undesirable" consumer law of
other states have boldly moved out of drafters' offices and into state
legislatures.
Consider, for example, a new Utah statute that
explicitly makes class action waivers in consumer credit contracts
enforceable.' 88 In celebrating the enactment, one of the new law's
champions stated: "With the enactment of Chapter 172, Utah-based
banks and other financial services companies will now be able to
argue forcefully that courts in other states, like California, should
enforce class action waivers contained in arbitration agreements to
which Utah financial services companies are partners."' 89 California
law, however, considers class action waivers to be unconscionable, at
class action rights is unconscionable). Elements of unreasonableness and unfairness-the
distance to be traveled to the "chosen" forum, availability of counsel there, procedural limitations
of the designated forum, and the size of the plaintiff's claim relative to these other
considerations-would also be elements in an unconscionability challenge. See, e.g., Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shane, 499 U.S. 585, 597-600 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (recognizing
that Shute would have to travel from her home state of Washington to Florida to bring a suit).
185. See supra text accompanying notes 18-21.
186. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2) (1971); see also supra text
accompanying note 21.
187. See supra Part III.A (discussing how unsophisticated parties often do not truly assent to
choice of law clauses).
188. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 70C-3-104, 70C-4-105 (2001 & Supp. 2006).
189. R. Christian Bruce, New Utah Law That Upholds Class Waivers May Have Nationwide
Application, Firm Says, BANKING REPORT, Mar. 27, 2006, at 593.
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least in some settings. 9 ' Thus, the Utah legislation raises the
question whether a choice of law provision choosing Utah law in a
California customer's form actually could alter that result.
Two California cases that followed the California Supreme
Court's important 2005 decision in Discover Bank v. Superior

Court9' make clear the power of a choice of law clause, as viewed
by California courts. 9 2 While the courts in those cases assumed the
clauses were binding contractually and proceeded with the
complicated conflict of laws analysis described earlier,'93 the
decisions can inform a discussion of how contract law's
unconscionability doctrine might offer similar protection, and how
the specific articulation of the legal argument might matter.
The first of these cases, Discover Bank v. Superior Court

(Discover Bank H), ' was the decision on remand from the
California Supreme Court. The court on remand assumed for
purposes of the opinion that class action waivers under the
circumstances before it were unenforceable under California law and
that this rule reflected "fundamental policy" of California.'95 The
court also concluded from Delaware precedent that Delaware law
considers class action waivers to be enforceable.' 96 Thus, for the
court, the outcome rested squarely on the conflicts question: which
law applied to that portion of the agreement.' 97 In many ways this
part of the case was easiest: because the plaintiff had gathered a
nationwide class for the class action, and (related to that decision)
had placed his claims exclusively on Delaware substantive law, the
court concluded under Section 187(2) of the Second Restatement of
Conflict of Laws that
California does not have a materially greater interest in
determination of the issue than Delaware ....

because (1)

Delaware is home to the sole defendant, not just (like
190. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1103, 1110 (Cal. 2005).
191. Id.
192. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 456 (Ct. App. 2006); Aral v.
Earthlink, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 229 (Ct. App. 2006).
193. See supra text accompanying note 20.
194. 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 456.
195. Id. at461.
196. Id. at 459-60 (citing Edelist v. MBNA Am. Bank, 790 A.2d 1249, 1260-61 (Del. Super.
Ct. 2001)).
197. Id. at 458.
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California) home to some portion of the putative class, (2)
Delaware has demonstrated by statute its concern that
Delaware law should apply to claims between Delaware
banks and their cardholders, and (3) Boehr is asserting
claims under Delaware law alone.'98
Aral v. Earthlink'99 may be seen as the companion case to
Discover Bank II. Aral was another class action, this time
challenging Earthlink's practice of charging customers usage fees
from the time of initial enrollment in its service even though
Earthlink did not deliver the modem, necessary to use its service,
until weeks later."' Earthlink's contract prohibited class actions,
called for the application of Georgia law, and specified that litigation
be conducted in Georgia.2 °'
Once again, the court determined that California law and
Georgia law differed on the enforceability of class action waivers;
the case thus came down to which state's law-California or
Georgia-controlled the question.2 2
The Aral court held that
California law controlled.
Critical to its decision was the fact that
Aral was a California class action consisting only of California
residents and was brought under California's Unfair Competition
Law, not the law of some other state. 4 Quoting the same provision
within the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Law as the Discover
Bank H court, the California court of appeal had no difficulty
concluding that "California has a 'materially greater interest than
[Georgia] in the determination of [this] particular issue .... 205
The outcomes in these cases would probably have been the same
with or without the choice of law clauses.0 6 Without enforceable
198. Id. at 461-62.
199. 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 229 (Ct. App. 2005).
200. Id. at 232-33.
201. Id. at 232. It should be obvious that together these provisions offered Earthlink nearcomplete insulation from any legal liability to California customers: only an economically
irrational Californian would travel to Georgia to assert such an individual claim against Earthlink.
202. Id. at 242-44.
203. Id. at 243-44.
204. Id. at 244.
205. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(c) (1971)).
206. The reasoning of these cases suggests that the new Utah legislation validating class
action waivers likely would not have altered the results in Aral or Discover Bank II had Utah law
been at issue in the California fora. See supra text accompanying note 188. Banking interests
may have achieved the intended extraterritorial effect somewhere, but California courts are not
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choice of law clauses, the question for the California courts would be
"what law governs the contract between the drafter and the
customers under California's general conflict of laws principles."
The California rule points to the law of the state which, with respect
to that issue, "has the most significant relationship to the transaction
2 7
and the parties.""
Given the reliance on Delaware law, the
Delaware domicile of the only defendant, and the nationwide class of
plaintiffs in Discover Bank II, there seems little doubt that Delaware
law could have been applicable in that case and that, therefore, the
class action waiver would have been enforceable. Similarly, given
the invocation of the California Unfair Competition Law and the
class of California plaintiffs in Aral, there seems little doubt that
California law should govern, and the class action waiver in that case
would be unconscionable and invalid. In both settings, then, the
adhesive choice of law provision was, essentially, superfluous.
Viewed in this way, an unconscionability challenge to the
binding effect of the choice of law provision itself-the assertion that
the choice of law provision itself is unconscionable and
unenforceable because it would undermine otherwise applicable
protective law-would preserve the outcomes of cases like Discover
Bank II and Aral and, at the same time, be far more direct and
transparent than a complex challenge using conflict of laws
principles. As a contract law challenge, the underlying premise is
that a conflict of laws analysis should not proceed until we reach the
legal conclusion that the customer is bound contractually to the
choice of law.
For the same reasons discussed in connection with the
reasonable expectations doctrine, an unconscionability challenge, of

likely to recognize the statute as changing anything in local class actions. In national class
actions such as the one involved in Discover Bank II (where Delaware law was held to control),
the Utah legislature may have achieved clarity in Utah's view on the matter. This might be useful
in cases like Discover II where the court concludes, despite a well-articulated challenge, that Utah
law controls the issues in a different state's forum.
207. ABF Capital Corp. v. Berglass, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 596 (Ct. App. 2005) (referring to
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS Section 188 (1971)); see also Henderson v.
Superior Court, 142 Cal. Rptr. 478, 485 (Ct. App. 1978) (discussing how "(1) the relationship of
defendant's forum-related activity to plaintiff's cause of action, (2) the relative burden of
litigation on the parties, and (3) the forum state's interest in exercising jurisdiction" are helpful in
determining the appropriate choice of forum); Int'l Serv. Ins. Co. v. Gonzales, 239 Cal. Rptr. 341,
344 n.4 (Ct. App. 1987) ("A contract is to be interpreted according to the law and usage of the
place where it is to be performed ....) (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1646 (West Supp. 2005).
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necessity, would be very narrow and fact-specific." 8 As both
Discover Bank and Aral show, choice of law provisions become
critical (and themselves arguably unconscionable) only when they
produce a result (here, the waiver of an important right) that the
ordinarily applicable law maintains is unconscionable or otherwise
invalid. The analysis therefore looks through the choice of law
clause to the underlying offensive provision. If that underlying
substantive provision would be unenforceable under otherwise
applicable law, then a choice of law provision attempting to alter that
result should fall away (as itself unconscionable and unenforceable)
and the analysis of the offensive provision should proceed as if there
were no choice of law provision.
Accordingly, the analysis should initially ignore the binding
effect of the choice of law provision in an adhesion contract.
Without the choice of law provision, the unconscionability challenge
to the offensive provision should be analyzed under the
unconscionability law that would otherwise apply to the contract
under the forum's ordinarily applicable choice of law rules. Thus, in
Discover Bank II, the ordinarily applicable law would likely have
been Delaware law, and Delaware law would have enforced the class
action waiver.2"9 The choice of law provision embracing Delaware
law would not have been unconscionable in California if for no other
reason than that it would not have prejudiced the customers.
Similarly, in Aral, California law would have applied and found the
waiver unenforceable and, thus, a choice of law provision intended to
"waive" that result would also have been unenforceable.
3. Reconciling the Contracts Analysis with
the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws
Both the reasonable expectations and the unconscionability
attacks suggested above result in general enforcement of the choice
of law provision except when those clauses interfere with the law
that would ordinarily protect the customer. As suggested above,
these approaches may offer advantages to customers over the
conflicts formulation in Section 187 of the Second Restatement of

208. See supra text accompanying notes 166-180 (discussing the reasonable expectations
doctrine).
209. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 456, 459 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
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Conflict of Laws, discussed earlier."' This is because they effectively
relax the Restatement's strong presumption that the "chosen" law be
applied. Since the decisions in most cases suggest that the Second
Restatement of Conflict of Laws offers the only limitations on choice
of law provisions (and have therefore embraced the presumed
enforceability articulated in the Restatement),2 1 1 we consider here
whether the more aggressive contract law-centered approaches
articulated above are sound as a policy matter.
The conflicts provision (which I have argued applies only after
applicable contract law finds a contractual bond) expresses a very
rigorous-and narrow-test for overriding a choice of law clause.
The choice of law provision must embrace a rule that is against the
fundamental policy of a state: (1) with a materially greater interest in
the issue, and (2) whose law would control under applicable conflicts
One would justify the
principles absent the choice of law clause.
narrowness of the Restatement's exception with recognition of the
commercial importance of contractual choice of law clauses
(commercial or contract law and free market economics policies) and
of the policies of accommodating and deferring to the law of sister
states with a stronger stake in a given controversy (conflict of laws
policies).2 13 That there may be differences between the outcomes
suggested by the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws and
contract law underscores that an approach that treats the contract
issues separately must, inevitably, take account of conflict of laws
policy and vice versa.
The question brought into focus by the apparent conflict
between the reasonable expectations and unconscionability doctrines
in contract law and the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws is
this: is it sounder (as a matter of some policy) to refuse to enforce the
choice of law clause insofar as it adversely affects the unwitting
customer (the relatively-broader Section 211(3) or unconscionability
210. See supra text accompanying notes 18-21.
211. See supra text accompanying note 166.
212. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1989).
213. Cf U.C.C. § 1-301 cmt. 6 (2003) (stating that the provision's "fundamental policy"
exception requires policy "so substantial that it justifies overriding the concerns for certainty and
predictability underlying modern commercial law as well as concerns for judicial economy
generally"). No State has enacted the provision in its promulgated form. Jack M. Graves, Party
Autonomy in Choice of CommercialLaw: The Failureof Revised UCC. § 1-301 and a Proposal
for BroaderReform, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 59, 62 (2005).
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approaches) or, more narrowly, to refuse to enforce the choice of law
clause only insofar as we can call the competing consumer protection
"fundamental policy" and meet the other restrictive criteria of the
Restatement? Both the "reasonable expectations" approach and the
unconscionability approaches, as outlined above, will have fewer
limitations and will likely create a larger carve-out from the chosen
law than would a "fundamental policy" analysis offered by conflict
of laws doctrine. Would that be a sensible choice?
Most indicators suggest that the contract methodology should be
dominant and that, therefore, a broader insulation of the choice of
law provision from the conflict of laws analysis is appropriate in the
context of adhesive forms.
Parties, of course, need an enforceable contractual choice of law
provision before courts can determine whether it should be
disregarded in whole or in part as a matter of conflicts policy. So the
logic of the situation calls for contract law dominance. More to the
point, this logic underpins Section 187 of the Seocond Restatement
of Conflict of Laws itself. That provision's approach to the problem
rests, in part, on the assumption that both parties freely chose the law
specified by the choice of law clause." 4 "Party autonomy" is what
justifies a strong presumption of enforceability, reflected in the
Restatement's test.2"5 However, if the underlying "party autonomy"
is weak (or non-existent) as it is in the adhesion contract setting, the
justification for a strong presumption is weak as well.
Indeed, commentary to the Second Restatement Conflict of
Laws provision suggests that the binding force of a choice of law
clause might properly be different in an adhesion contract setting
than otherwise.2"6 The Restatement provision was approved almost
214. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187, cmt. b (1971).
215. See supra text accompanying note 22.
216. Comment b to Section 187 of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws provides in
part:
A factor which the forum may consider is whether the choice-of-law provision is
contained in an "adhesion" contract, namely one that is drafted unilaterally by the
dominant party and then presented on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis to the weaker party
who has no real opportunity to bargain about its terms. Such contracts are usually
prepared in printed form, and frequently at least some of their provisions are in
extremely small print. Common examples are tickets of various kinds and insurance
policies. Choice-of-law provisions contained in such contracts are usually respected.
Nevertheless, the forum will scrutinize such contracts with care and will refuse to
apply any choice-of-law provision they may contain if to do so would result in
substantial injustice to the adherent.
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thirty years after Professor Kessler warned that "[f]reedom of
contract enables enterprisers to legislate.. .in a substantially
authoritarian manner without using the appearance of authoritarian
forms,"2"7 twenty years after Professor Ehrenzweig said that party
autonomy "ha[d] no place in the conflicts law of adhesion
' and perhaps thirty years before the appearance
contracts,"218
of the
cases and statutes considered here. The Restatement's reservations
become all the more salient if, as the evidence seems to suggest, the
recent cases represent a far wider phenomenon.
A second indicator that may suggest that a full range of contract
law defenses is consistent with the narrow exceptions to party
autonomy contemplated in Section 187 is the ill-fated redrafted
choice of law provision for Article 1 of the UCC promulgated in
2001 by NCCUSL. For the cases it covers, 19 this provision provides
both a very broad consumer protection provision and a very narrow
fundamental policy provision. 2 0 Many believed at the time that the
innovative consumer provision merely stated, in a statutory form,
what nearly all courts would do anyway, if given the chance.2 1
Choice of law clauses have never been thought to yield an escape
from all otherwise-applicable business regulation.22
Revised UCC Section 1-301's consumer protection provision
requires the operation of ordinarily applicable consumer law despite
a contrary choice of law provision if that rule is a non-waivable rule
that is "protective of consumers.

2

23

This is a contract law-based

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. b.
217. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,
43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 640 (1943).
218. Ehrenzweig, supra note 15.
219. The complexity of the provision is driven in part by the drafters' efforts to keep the
protection to cases within the scope of the UCC U.C.C. § 1-301 cmt. 1 (2003).
220. See U.C.C. §§ 1-301(e)--(f). The provision has been rejected by every state that has
considered it. John Krahmer, Annual Survey of Texas Law: Commercial Transaction, 57 SMU L.
REv. 699, 718 n.8 (2004). The rejection is probably the result of opposition to its provision
permitting contracting parties to select any law (including the law of states that had enacted
UCITA) and of its explicit carve-outs for both consumers and for fundamental policy.
221. See Kathleen Patchel & Boris Auerbach, The Article I Revision Process, 54 SMU L.
REv. 603, 612-13 (2001).
222. Even die-hard contractarians concede (reluctantly) that much of consumer law is
mandatory and "inalienable" by contract. See Ware, supra note 6, at 207-12.
223. UCC Section 1-301(e)(2) applies only to a narrowly-defined "consumer" and reads:
(2) Application of the law of the State or country determined pursuant to subsection (c)
or (d) may not deprive the consumer of the protection of any rule of law governing a
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provision recognizing the low quality of party autonomy in the
adhesion contract context. By contrast, the provision's "fundamental
policy" exception 224-a conflict of laws-based policy-is quite
different and, as the Official Comment makes clear, applies only in
the narrowest of circumstances.225 The policy inference one draws
from the juxtaposition of these provisions is that the conflict of laws
policy of "party autonomy" is very important when one can be
confident it actually exists.

If it does not exist (as it cannot in

"consumer contracts" at minimum),2 6 there is no policy reason to
enforce a choice of law provision in a form to the disadvantage of the
non-drafter.
While the UCC provision remains unenacted for (probably)
many reasons,227 it was approved by the American Law Institute and
NCCUSL and reflects the most recent effort to resolve the tension
between the commercial benefits of choice of law clauses and the
perceived importance of state law protecting consumers.22 8 The
UCC's resolution of the issues is consistent with the dominance of a
contract analysis in the context of adhesion contracts.
In the broader context, both the reasonable expectations and
unconscionability analyses also coincide with a rule in force for over

matter within the scope of this section, which both is protective of consumers and may
not be varied by agreement:
(A) of the State or country in which the consumer principally resides, unless
subparagraph (B) applies; or
(B) if the transaction is a sale of goods, of the State or country in which the consumer
both makes the contract and takes delivery of those goods, if such State or country is
not the State or country in which the consumer principally resides.
U.C.C. §1-103 (e)(2).
224. Id. § 1-301(f).
225. Id. § 1-301, cmt. 6.
226. "Consumer" is too narrow a group to protect from adhesive choice of law or forum
clauses; adhesive choice of law or forum clauses also adversely affect small businesses. See infra
text beginning at note 245.
227. UCC Section 1-301 has been enacted only in the Virgin Islands and has been rejected by
every state that has considered it. Krahmer, supra note 220. A coalition of insurance companies
and libraries has opposed it because it permits parties to choose "unrelated" law. See, e.g., Letter
from Americans for Fair Electronic Commerce Transactions (AFFECT) to John A. Hart, Jr.,
Mass. State Senator (Mar. 28, 2003) (on file with author). The American Bankers' Association
has opposed it because of the consumer provision quoted above. Memorandum from L.H.
Wilson, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Am. Bankers Assoc. to Members of Drafting Committee to Revise
U.C.C. Article I and Interested Persons (May 3, 2001) (on file with the author).
228. See U.C.C. § 1-301.
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twenty-five years in the European Union.229 Some states have
achieved similar results in discrete areas through direct legislation
that will be considered below.
C. The Limitations of the Common Law
in PolicingChoice of Law Clauses
Any realist who looked at the system-wide implications of
widespread adhesive choice of law clauses, and at the aggressive
attempts to gain their enforcement, would realize that the potential
for effective policing through the judiciary is not good. The offer
and acceptance doctrines as reflected in cases like Hill v. Gateway
2000 and Specht v. Netscape will be useful in only a handful of
cases. Successful attacks based on unconscionability would have to
be fact-specific and would not likely create broad rules usable by
other courts. Choice of forum clauses that "hide" important
procedural features, such as the lack of a class action device, are
easily correctable by drafters and are unlikely to affect the vendor's
sales.23 The Second Restatement of Contracts Section 211(3), a
doctrine as well-suited to police choice of law clauses as it is to
police insurance contracts, will have the additional problems of
judicial hostility and critiques that have claimed it is intolerably
vague and unworkable.23 ' The conflict of laws limitations are no
better-they are either very fact-specific ("unfair or unreasonable")
or extraordinarily complex (Section 187(2) of Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws).

32

In short, the "covert tools," such as interpretation and contract
formation doctrines, invite corrections by the vendors and thus are
short lived. Direct judicial policing via reasonable expectations,
unconscionability, and related doctrines, in this context particularly,
229. The treaty is known as the Rome Convention. Convention on the Law Applicable to
2, opened for signature June 19, 1980, 1980 O.J. (L 266)
Contractual Obligations, art. 5,
[hereinafter Rome Convention] ("[A] choice of law made by the parties shall not have the result
of depriving the consumer of the protection afforded to him by the mandatory rules of the law of
the country in which he has his habitual residence .... ").
230. See Woodward, supra note 16, at 43-44 (discussing how easily drafters can fix choice of
forum clauses to sway any given direction).
231. Amy D. Cubbage, The Interaction of the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations and
Ambiguity in Drafting: The Development of the Kentucky Formulation, 85 KY. L.J. 435, 444-45
(1997) (noting that Arizona is the only state to expressly adopt the Restatement version of the
reasonable expectations doctrine).
232. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2) (1989).
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tends to be very fact-specific and complex. Moreover, pursuing
grievances through court can be very costly for litigants, which
makes that solution largely inaccessible as a practical matter in the
typically-small transactions where it is needed.233
But beyond all this is an overriding fact: if contract law
development proceeds as it has for the past twenty years, nearly all
of these cases will be decided by arbitrators under arbitration
agreements contained in the very same contracts that contain the
choice of law clauses. 34 Such cases produce no precedent or public
record of decisions and, absent class actions, are unlikely to be large
enough for sophisticated attacks on the choice of law or forum
clauses to make economic sense.235 We might hope that policing
takes place in the arbitration hearing room, but we have no way to
find out what the decisions are on a system-wide basis, much less to
understand the reasoning behind them. A reliable base of case law is
not likely to develop given the current phenomenon of near-universal
displacement of the common law system by private arbitration
systems. Without strong, accessible, and reported case law, appeals
based on precedent, even to potentially-sympathetic arbitrators,
cannot be developed.
A potential alternative is legislation;
fortunately, there are some models.
IV.

PROTECTING LOCAL LAWS WITH SHIELD LEGISLATION

Even if cases are brought that can support the expense involved
in common law attacks on these clauses, even if they survive the a
motion to compel arbitration, and even if they generate judicial
precedent,236 the precedent is likely to be narrow and distinguishable
233. See generally Leff, supra note 174 (arguing that the common law tradition of regulating
the quality of transactions on a case-by-case basis is inefficient and expensive when the costs of
cases are taken in the aggregate).
234. See Knapp, supra note 149, at 778-80 (arguing that arbitration deprives the legal system
of valuable precedent through which the common law grows)
235. Id. at 784-85.
236. It is curious that many of the cases in this general area are "withdrawn" or
"unpublished." See, e.g., Alejandro v. L.S. Holding Inc., 130 F. App'x 544 (3d Cir. 2005);
Dambrosio v. Comcast Corp., 142 F. App'x 87 (3d Cir. 2005); Lloyd v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A.,
27 F. App'x 82 (3d Cir. 2002); McLemore v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., No. A106373, 2005 WL
1634981 (Cal. Ct. App. July 13, 2005); Wilson v. Mike Steven Motors, Inc., 111 P.3d 1076 (Kan.
Ct. App. 2005); Talgo LRC., LLC v. Livingston Rebuild Ctr., Inc., 77 P.3d 553 (Mont. 2003).
How they come to be withdrawn, whether there is any pattern to the would-be precedents that
become non-precedents, and what this means for the common law system is the subject of an
emerging literature. See Richard B. Cappalli, The Common Law's CaseAgainst Non-Precedential
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in the next case. Moreover, that precedent will be frozen in time. Its
next readers will likely be arbitrators who will leave no record of
whether they followed, distinguished, or rejected the precedential
case. Arbitrators are, however, typically obligated to follow the
law.237 We can probably have more confidence that they will follow
a clear statute restricting choice of law clauses than that they will
follow a precedential case with inevitably different facts. We are in
a legal environment where legislative action, though difficult to
achieve, may be more effective.
The efforts of businesses to displace local regulation through
contractual choice of law clauses, or to reduce their legal exposure to
claims through choice of forum clauses are not new phenomena.238
Some legislatures have attempted to limit these efforts; consequently,
there are now many models for legislative constraints on both choice
of law and forum clauses.239 The focus of this Part will be primarily
on limitations to choice of law clauses through legislative
alternatives; inevitably, choice of forum clauses will be implicated.
The discussion will begin with coverage issues and proceed to some
of the key questions that a legislature must address in order to craft
appropriate shield legislation.
A. Limiting Legislation to the Appropriate
Classes of Choice ofLaw and Forum Clauses

Widespread recognition of the value of choice of law clauses has
no doubt fueled the legal transition from a regime of widespread
judicial rejection to one of widespread acceptance and legislative
approval.24 There is little doubt that these provisions add value in
Opinions, 76 S. CAL. L. REv. 755, 788-93 (2003) (describing the criteria and method used by
judges in designating cases as non-precedential and examining the patterns behind withdrawal of
cases for precedential value); Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84
B.U. L. REv. 1, 45-46 (2004) (examining the negative ramifications that nonpublication has on
the common law); Donald R. Songer, Danna Smith & Reginald S. Sheehan, Nonpublication in the
Eleventh Circuit:An Empirical Analysis, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 963, 984 (1989) (presenting an
empirical study on the patterns followed by the Eleventh Circuit regarding nonpublication).
237. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 63637 (1985).
238. See, e.g., Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519-20 (1974) (finding that an
arbitration agreement's Illinois choice of law clause, stipulated by an American manufacturer,
was binding against a German company).
239. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2) (1989).
240. Cf Sherck, 417 U.S. at 516 ("A contractual provision specifying in advance the forum in
which disputes shall be litigated and the law to be applied is, therefore, an almost indispensable
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negotiated transactions;24 ' and they likely add value for the drafter in
the adhesion contract setting as well. 242 As a practical matter, then,
restrictions on the operation of choice of law clauses will necessarily
be limited. If legislative restrictions are appropriate, to which
contracts and terms should the legislation apply? State legislation
and proposals for legislation developed over the past twenty years
illustrate the many variables to consider.243
A first cut at narrowing the scope of protective legislation is to
separate adhesion contracts from other contracts and to limit the
regulation to the former. Despite the freedom of contract rhetoric
that often accompanies support for choice of law and forum
clauses,244 these clauses have relatively weak justification because
true assent is often absent. How might one categorize situations
lacking true assent to protect non-drafters in those settings?
At the outset, it is important to recognize that scope restrictions
will operate differently here than in other kinds of state legislation.
Restrictions on the operation of some subset of choice of law clauses
will have no substantive effect on the underlying law; they will
simply preserve it from ouster by choice of law clauses. As a result,
the underlying rules will retain their own scope; if those rules protect
a narrow set of beneficiaries, the range of protection will not change.
Thus, an initial question for policy makers is whether to preserve all
precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any international
business transaction.").
241. By simply eliminating argument about what law applies in a given case, choice of law
provisions achieve economic benefits for the parties making the contract. See O'Rourke, supra
note 45, at 654 (noting that choice of law clauses should decrease transaction costs). Determinate
conflict of laws rules could, in theory, perform this same service, but they have never come close
to doing so. See John Linarelli, The Economics of Uniform Laws and Uniform Lawmaking, 48
WAYNE L. REv. 1387, 1407-08 (2003) (discussing how conflict of law rules often do not cut
transaction costs).
242. The drafter gets value in (1)the reduced legal uncertainty about what law generally will
apply to its contract or what forum will hear controversies and (2) the legal advantages for the
drafter (e.g., different standards for unconscionability) that the selected law has over the
otherwise applicable law. See Rourke, supra note 241; Woodward, supra note 145, at 255, 264.
The value in reduced uncertainty does not necessarily come at the expense of the customer; the
value in shifted advantage does. See Woodward, supra note 144, at 255, 264. Whether the
customer shares in any of the value depends on the general competition, competition in contract
terms, and a host of other factors. See Id. at 264. Not surprisingly, it is thus an open question for
which there is no empirical evidence.
243. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1646.5 (West Supp. 2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2).
244. E.g., Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1118, 1124 (Cal. 2005) (Baxter,
J., dissenting).
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or most of a state's protective rules (whatever they may be and
whomever they may protect) or some subset of them. Any shield
law with a scope narrower than the broadest scope found in
protective state law has the potential for uninsulating the rules (and

beneficiaries) not covered by the shield. Advocates will argue that a
rule insulating only "consumer protection" from choice of law
clauses carries with it the legislative intent that rules outside the
shield's scope-protective rules applicable to non-consumers-may
now be waived by choice of law clauses.24 5

1. The Narrow Scope of "Consumers" and "Consumer Transactions"
It should be obvious that for choice of law clauses the quality of

the assent of consumers and small business people in day-to-day
adhesive transactions is likely to be very similar.2 46 Neither will
likely read choice of law clauses; neither will likely understand the

implications even if the clauses are read; neither will have any
opportunity to negotiate their terms; and neither will, in the run of

transactions, be able to justify devoting economic resources to a
higher level of awareness.2 47 Nonetheless, perhaps out of habit, the
most common limitations we find in statutory efforts to limit choice
of law and forum clauses are those that limit the protection to a class
of "consumers. '248 "Consumer" is, in turn, very narrowly defined in

the UCC as "an individual who enters into a transaction primarily for
personal, family, or household purposes. '"249
This was the class of transactions that was protected from choice

245. Franchisee protection and rules limiting no compete provisions in employment contracts
are two examples of non-consumer rules that states commonly consider non-waivable. See, e.g.,
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921A(2) (1998 & Supp. 2006) (expressly prohibiting choice of law
provisions in employment contracts); MINN. STAT. § 80C.21 (West 1999 & Supp. 2006)
(expressly prohibiting choice of law provisions in franchisee contracts).
246. Some would argue that true assent is not the test but that only "manifestation" of assent
should be required. See, e.g., Ware, supra note 6, at 204. See generally Radin, supra note 49, at
1160-61 (arguing that online contracts have attenuated the traditional notion of consent).
Advocates of the "manifestation of assent" school have not explained how customers discriminate
among competing liability-limiting or choice of law/forum clauses without reading or
understanding them and, if they do not so discriminate, how the "manifestation of assent"
analysis squares even with classical Chicago School economic analysis. See Woodward, supra
note 145, at 272-73.
247. See Woodward, supra note 145, at 248, 264-65.
248. Id. at 284.
249. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(11) (2003).
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of law clauses in the UCC's innovative Revised Section 1-301.250 it
is the class of transactions protected from adhesive choice of law and
forum clauses in the first UCC provision to address the issue, UCC
Section 2A-106 dealing with consumer leases.25 Only one stateLouisiana-has enacted legislation restricting both choice of law and
choice of forum provisions generally, again limited to this construct
of "consumer." Louisiana's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Law provides that "[t]he following terms of a writing
executed by a consumer are invalid with respect to consumer
transactions or modifications thereof: (1) that the law of another state
will apply; (2) that the consumer consents to the jurisdiction of
another state; or (3) any term that fixes venue. 252 This narrow
definition is also similar to that of the Federal Truth in Lending
Act.2 53 It has even migrated to the international arena as a limit to

applicability of the choice of forum enforcement in the draft Hague
Conference on Private International Law. 254

As defined, the

restriction identifies this group of essentially personal transactions
for protection.
The problem with protecting only these narrowly-defined
"consumers" is, of course, that the restriction does not protect
individuals entering transactions for their small businesses, even if
they are no more sophisticated than the hypothetical "consumer" and
even if the transaction itself is too small to carry the costs of
250. See id. § 1-301(e).
251. Section 2A-106 governs "Limitation on Power of Parties to Consumer Lease to Choose
Applicable Law and Judicial Forum," and provides:
(1) If the law chosen by the parties to a consumer lease is that of a jurisdiction other
than a jurisdiction in which the lessee resides at the time the lease agreement becomes
enforceable or within 30 days thereafter or in which the goods are to be used, the
choice is not enforceable.
(2) If the judicial forum chosen by the parties to a consumer lease is a forum that
would not otherwise have jurisdiction over the lessee, the choice is not enforceable.
U.C.C. § 2A-106 (2003).
252. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1418 (2006). The Louisiana Supreme Court recently decided
an arbitration case, resolving a split in its circuits in favor of arbitration. Aguillard v. Auction
Mgmt. Corp., 2004-2804, p. 25 (La. 6/29/2005); 908 So. 2d 1, 18. The arbitration provision
specified that arbitration would take place in Dallas, Texas. Id. at 13 n.12. At issue was the
binding effect of the arbitration clause itself, not its location. Id. at 7. The applicability of the
statute to this arguable "change in venue" was not raised by the parties nor mentioned by the
court. See id.
253. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)( 11)-(12) (2006).
254. Special Commission on Jurisdiction, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Work. Doc. No. 110, 2004).

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:9

understanding the choice of law or forum clause, of reading it, or of
negotiating about it. It would not protect the dentist buying a
toothbrush for the office, the doctor buying a scalpel, or the lawyer
buying a UCC text. The rough cut made by the "consumer" category
is, in short, under-inclusive in most contexts, and particularly in this
one.

255

If the term "consumer" is to be a limitation, it need not be such a
narrow category. The European approach has been to define a
"consumer" by exclusion, as someone not acting in his or her
professional capacity.256
Even broader is the definition of
"consumer" found in the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer
Protection Act. 257

The fundamental obscurity of choice of law

clauses, their capacity to hide important implications of an adherent's
"agreement" to them, and the particular irrationality of adherents'
acceptance of them even when they are perceived 258 supports either a
substantially expanded definition of "consumer" or an entirely
different form of classification in this context. The latter is a more
straightforward approach. One way to reclassify could be based on
the level of interaction between the parties or, more specifically, the
size of their transaction.
2. Expanding the Scope of "Consumer" Through
Transaction Size Limitations and the "Mass-Market" Construct
To target statutes that limit the enforceability of choice of law
clauses, a relatively simple approach might be to discriminate on the
basis of transaction size. At the core of our problem is the fact that
consumers and small businesses cannot, in the run of ordinary
transactions, understand the consequences of a choice of law
255. See Woodward, supra note 145, at 265; see also Garvin, supra note 143, at 296-97.
256. Rome Convention, supra note 229, art. Para. 1.
257. That act defines "consumer" as:
[A]n individual, partnership, corporation, this state, or a subdivision or agency of this
state who seeks or acquires by purchase or lease, any goods or services, except that the
term does not include a business consumer that has assets of $25 million or more, or
that is owned or controlled by a corporation or entity with assets of $25 million or
more.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45 (Vernon 2002).
258. See generally David A. Hoffman, The "Duty" To Be a Rational Shareholder,90 MINN.
L. REV. 537 (2006) (looking at rationality in the decision making process). But see Garvin, supra
note 143, at 308 (noting that when consumers make decisions without full information, they act
"intendedly rational, but only limitedly so").
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provision on the value exchanged through their contract. Is a form
choosing the law of New York a more valuable one to the customer
than one choosing the law of Ireland? 59 Most routine transactions
are simply not large enough to support the resources required for the
customer to become an "informed shopper" for a controlling legal
system. Even if the drafter were amenable to negotiation, the
customer could not assess the relative values of competing choices of
law and, as a result, would be incapable of rational negotiation.
Perhaps more important, without adequate information, a customer
cannot even make an informed decision whether to go forward with a
given transaction or, instead, forego the given choice of law
provision for a "better deal."
Such market failure is less likely to occur in a large transaction
because the transaction size could carry the information costs
entailed in an informed customer choice of law. Perhaps recognizing
this, several state statutes expanding rights under choice of law
clauses have limited the expanded rights to parties engaged in large
transactions exceeding specified dollar amounts.26 The apparent
implication is that, with the assurance of true assent that comes with
a large transaction, the dangers of abuse are minimized.
The same idea could lead to a corollary. For example, a statute
that differentiates between large and small contracts, and regulates
only the smaller ones, would correspond to the dynamics of true
choice implicated in the economics of the situation. In other words,
a legislature could create a subset of small transactions, those below
a given dollar amount, for protection from choice of law or forum
clauses (or from specified effects of such clauses). Tying protection
to the size of the transaction treats consumers and small businesses
alike in situations where the transaction itself cannot bear the cost
either of ascertaining the economic implications of the clauses or of
considering alternatives.
There is a practical problem with this sort of statutory limitation.
Since any dollar limitation would be an arbitrary number, agreeing to
259. Cf William J. Woodward, Jr., Neoformalism in a Real World of Forms, 2001 Wis. L.
REV. 971, 989-90 n.75 (2001) (arguing that where the transaction is small and the contract term
is obscure or complex, the non-drafting party likely does not truly understand the writing he or
she is "assenting" to).
260. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1646.5 (West Supp. 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit, 6, § 2708
(2005); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401 (McKinney 2006); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §
35.51 (Vernon 2005 & Supp. 2006).
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an appropriate number could be difficult for legislatures to achieve.
One might imagine that only transactions of considerable size could
support a reasonable opportunity for the non-drafter to consider the
implications of a choice of law provision."' On the other hand,
limiting protection to contracts where the value exchanged is, say,
less than $5,000 would severely limit the impact of choice of law
clauses in adhesive settings. 6z
Limiting protection to "mass-market contracts" is an entirely
different approach.
The drafters of the Uniform Consumer
Information Transactions Act (UCITA) deserve credit for developing
the innovative (though in context very unwieldy) idea of a "massmarket transaction," a category that includes both transactions with
consumers as well as certain adhesion contract transactions with
large and small businesses.263 While the idea had great promise, its
statutory context undercut the usefulness of the protection UCITA
purported to offer. Moreover, it suffered from underbreadth 4 and
261. Cf Woodward, supra note 259, at 990 (arguing that where the transaction is small and
the contract term is obscure or complex, the rational non-drafting party is very unlikely to
understand the writing he or she is "assenting" to or, more to the point, take the time to do so).
262. Id.
263. See U.C.I.T.A. § 102(a)(45) (2002). Not a model of simplicity, it provides:
(45) "Mass-market transaction" means a transaction that is:
(A) a consumer contract; or
(B) any other transaction with an end-user licensee if:
(i) the transaction is for information or informational rights directed to the
general public as a whole, including consumers, under substantially the same
terms for the same information;
(ii) the licensee acquires the information or informational rights in a retail
transaction under terms and in a quantity consistent with an ordinary transaction
in a retail market; and
(iii) the transaction is not:
(I) a contract for redistribution or for public performance or public
display of a copyrighted work;
(II) a transaction in which the information is customized or otherwise
specially prepared by the licensor for the licensee, other than minor
customization using a capability of the information intended for that
purpose;
(III) a site license; or
(IV) an access contract.
Id. See generally Holly K. Towle, Mass-market Transactions in the Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act, 38 DUQ. L. REV. 371 (2000) (explaining the broadened scope of
consumer protection laws in "mass-market transactions" under UCITA).
264. Jean Braucher, The Failed Promise of the UCITA Mass-Market Concept and Its Lessons
for Policing of StandardForm Contracts, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 393, 402-03 (2003).
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ultimately was not widely adopted.2 65 Regulation that is complex
advantages the sophisticated user and, in that sense, disadvantages
the very individuals it is purporting to protect. Professor Jean
Braucher has distilled several features of form contracts identified in
UCITA's mass-market construct that could prove useful in
narrowing a policing provision: terms are contained in a standard
form issued by the drafter; there is the lack of a possibility of
negotiating the terms at issue; and there is weak market policing.26 6
Choice of law and forum clauses, of course, share these
characteristics in all non-negotiated, standard form contracts.
The latest edition of the mass-market construct is found in an
innovative extension of the idea in a draft of Intellectual Property:
PrinciplesGoverning Jurisdiction,Choice of Law, and Judgments in
TransnationalDisputes, 6' an ongoing project of the American Law
Institute (ALI). This effort is especially relevant to our project here
because both choice of law and choice of forum clauses are specially
limited in "mass-market contracts. 26 8 Most significant for our
purposes here is the elegant definition of the construct found in
Section 101(2), which provides that "[a] 'Mass-market contract' is
one that is (a) prepared by one party for repeated use; (b) presented
to the other party (the "non-drafting party") by the first party; and (c)
accepted without the nondrafting party having a meaningful
opportunity to negotiate its terms. "269 This scope provision is a
substantial improvement over what has come before: it is not nearly
so narrow as the more common "consumer contract," it lacks the
complexity of UCITA's version, and it is directly related to the core
of the problem-the lack of a reasonable opportunity to negotiate
terms.
3. Shifting the Burden of Proof
to Drafters of Choice of Law Provisions
A potentially more restrictive, but far more flexible, approach
would erect broad protection yet allow the drafter to avoid
265. See infra note 300 and accompanying text.
266. Braucher, supra note 264.
267. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES GOVERNING JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW,
AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES (Discussion Draft, 2006).

268. Id. §§ 202, 302.
269. Id. § 101.
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restrictions by proving that the provision was actually negotiated, not
unfairly imposed, or fair. In Kubis & Perszyk Associates, Inc. v. Sun
Microsystems, Inc.2" ° a franchise case, the New Jersey court required
the drafter to establish that a choice of forum provision was not
unfairly imposed on the New Jersey franchisee."7 ' Analogously, an
earlier draft of ALI's Intellectual Property: Principles Governing
Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and Judgments in Transnational
Disputes offered special protection to recipients of choice of forum
or law clauses in "non-negotiated contracts." ' In both choice of law
and choice of forum contexts, the contract provision could be
enforced if it was "reasonable" in light of enumerated factors.7
A third example of this approach is found in an innovative
proposal from a private consortium of software buyers called
Americans for Fair Electronic Commerce Transactions (AFFECT).2 74
AFFECT developed the proposal to protect customers from
application of the UCITA through choice of law and forum clauses
in software contracts.275 It limits choice of law and forum clauses in
all such contracts regardless of their size, but permits vendors to
avoid the restriction by a showing of clear and convincing evidence
that the choice of law or forum clause was actually negotiated.276
270. 680 A.2d 618 (N.J. 1996); see also supra text accompanying notes 118-129.
271. For a quote of the court's rule, see supra text accompanying note 128. Under its rule, a
choice of forum provision in a New Jersey franchise contract is presumptively invalid unless the
franchisor can make the required showing. Kubis & Perszyk Assocs., 680 A.2d at 627.
272. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES GOVERNING JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW,
AND JUDGMENTS INTRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES §§ 202, 302 (Council Draft No. 1, 2005) (forum
and law respectively) [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY]. While the term was undefined in
the black letter, Comment d to Section 202 says: "These are contracts in which the terms are
entirely prepackaged.
They are common in transactions involving information products,
appearing in products delivered in physical form as so-called 'shrinkwrap' licenses, and in
products delivered digitally as 'clickwrap' licenses." Id. § 202, cmt. d.
273. Id. §§ 202(4)(a), 302(5)(a). The draft was not explicit about who had the burden of
bringing a situation into the "non-negotiated" category; one would imagine it was the nondrafter's initial burden.
274. Americans for Fair Electronic Transactions, UCITA "Bomb Shelter" Legislation,
http://affect.ucita.com/pdf/UCITABombShelter.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2006).
275. Id.
276. Section 3 of the Model UCITA Bomb Shelter Legislation and Commentary proposed by
AFFECT provides:
SECTION 3. Exceptions. The provisions of Section 2 [making choice of law and
forum clauses in defined "computer information agreements" voidable] will not apply
to transactions where the law chosen bears a reasonable relation to the parties or their
transaction and it is established by clear and convincing evidence that (a) both the
choice of law and choice of forum provisions were specifically bargained for by the
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By making the choice of law and forum clauses presumptively
invalid and placing the burden of proof on a vendor to avoid the
effects of the protective provision, all three variations solve the
arbitrariness problem of dollar limitations and offer substantial
protection.
In the three examples just discussed, the limitation on subject
matter confines what otherwise might be broadsides on choice of law
or forum clauses. The rule announced by the New Jersey court is
limited to franchise contracts; 277 the UCITA bomb-shelter provision
is limited to contracts within the scope of UCITA;2 75 the ALI project
is limited to transnational intellectual property situations.2 79 The
narrow foci of these efforts reflect the settings in which they have
been developed.
4. Subject Matter Limitations in Statutes
Restricting Choice of Law Provisions
The limited subject matter addressed in the last three examples
is emblematic of a broader phenomenon: most statutory efforts to
limit the impact of choice of law or forum clauses confine
themselves to a specific class of adherents or contracts (typically,
"consumer contracts") and to a limited subject matter. For example,
Article 2A of the UCC, the first widely-enacted statutory restriction
on choice of law and forum provisions in adhesive situations, denied
enforceability of such provisions for "consumer leases" in Section
Various legislative provisions designed to structure
2A-106."8
business relationships with residents often contain "anti-waiver"
provisions that courts can interpret to forbid "waiver" through choice
parties and (b) the contract's provisions stating choice of law and choice of forum were
the product of fully informed choice of both parties. Language to this effect in a
written agreement is, without additional evidence, insufficient to satisfy this Section.
Id.
277. Kubis & Perszyk Assocs., Inc. v. Sun Microsys., Inc., 680 A.2d 618, 627 (N.J. 1996).
278. The provision is limited to "computer information agreements," which it defines as "a
contract or agreement that falls within the scope of the Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act, whether or not that act actually applies .... " Americans for Fair Electronic
Transactions UCITA "Bomb Shelter" Legislation, http://affect.ucita.com/pdf/UCITABomb
Shelter.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2006).
279. Section 102(1) states: "These Principles apply to civil disputes involving copyrights,
neighboring rights, patents, trade secrets, trademarks, domain names, and related intellectual
property rights, that are connected to more than one State." INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra
note 272, § 102.
280. See supranote 251.
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of law clauses. 8 ' They obviously only have effect where that
particular legislation is operable.
The innovative (though unenacted) provision in Proposed
Article 1 of the U.C.C. 282 provided its broader protection to
consumers only for those transactions that were "within the scope of
'
this Section."283
This meant all transactions within the scope of the
entire U.C.C., but, still, a subset of all consumer contracts. In this
instance, in particular, the limited scope brought with it complexity
that may have contributed to its defeat in the state legislatures. The
section applied, and therefore the consumer protection provisions
kicked in, only "to the extent that" the transaction was governed by
another U.C.C. provision.284 As if to reiterate this limitation (or to
appease opponents by showing that the provision would not affect
their clients' businesses), the consumer protection provision itself
was prefaced by the "to the extent" language.285
As a statutory drafting matter, it is difficult to know whether the
provision's language led to its overall defeat or whether that same
language made the provision more politically sellable than it
otherwise might have been. While litigation over the scope and
coverage of a given statute is nothing new and is an implication of
any statute covering limited subject matter, here it potentially
undercut the statutory protection available to individuals who would
use it.286 The language also created commercial uncertainty that was
281. See, e.g., Am. Online, Inc. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699, 712 (Ct. App. 2001)
(refusing to enforce choice of Virginia law provision because it would amount to waiver of
plaintiff's unwaivable right to bring a class action); see also supra text accompanying notes 118129 (discussing Kubis & Perszyk Assocs., Inc., 680 A.2d at 618); cf supra text accompanying
notes 104-110 (discussing America Online, Inc. v. Booker, 781 So. 2d 423, 424-25 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2001).
Sometimes the legislature itself makes an explicit connection between choice of law or
forum provisions and adhesive contracts as did Minnesota which added "including any choice of
law provision" to the anti-waiver provision of its franchise protection statute. MINN. STAT. §
80C.21 (West 1999).
282. U.C.C. § 1-301(e)(2) (2003). For a quote, see supra note 223.
283. Id. § 1-301(e). Comments to the provision make it abundantly clear that the U.C.C. is a
statute of limited scope. Both the liberality in choosing law (choice was not limited to a "related"
jurisdiction) and the protection offered to consumers were limited to transactions within the scope
of the UCC See id. § 1-301 cmt. 1. If ever enacted anywhere, these scope issues promise great
uncertainty in the application of the provisions. Woodward, supra note 31, at 739-46.
284. U.C.C. § 1-301(b).

285. U.C.C. §§ 1-301(e)-(O.
286. The UCC drafters may have had no alternatives. Their expertise and delegated power

extended only to the UCC, not to other subject areas that might have been covered by legislation.
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used by opponents to battle enactment.287 Clear, determinate, easy to
apply provisions should be the goal, both for enhanced commercial
certainty and for ease of use by the beneficiaries who lack the
resources to litigate complex scope issues.

28 8

Ease of use, and therefore effectiveness, counsels against subject
matter limitations in this context. More importantly, state rules of
one kind or another designed to protect a state's residents from
contractual overreaching are scattered through every state's
legislation and case law.2 89 A statute intended to shield only some of
a state's protective rules from adhesive choice of law clauses will
likely be underinclusive. On the other hand, a broad statute intended
to protect residents from loss of any of their state's legal protection
through adhesive choice of law clauses may well attract far more
opposition from business groups than will legislation that affects
only a subset of adhesive choice of law provisions. As a political
matter, it might be sensible to begin modestly, with limited subject
matter, rather than invite opposition from many business groups at
once. Even then, the political task will be formidable.29 °
B. Substituting Voided Chosen Law with ProtectiveLaw

When a court uses a conflict of laws or contract law principle to
avoid a choice of law provision in an adhesion contract, it does so in
a particular context that has been put in issue by the claimant. The
adherent's contention is that the contractual choice of law provision
in the underlying agreement has had no effect on the particular
Each of the UCC Articles has its own subject matter scope and Article 1, stating general
principles for the entire code is, logically, limited to the scope of the other Articles.
287. Woodward, supra note 31, at 735-37 & n.175.
288. While the statute may have been difficult to use, on the long view, it could have been
very influential (as was its predecessor, UCC Section 1-105) in establishing norms that might
have applied outside its limited ambit. This may explain why the American Bankers' Association
so vigorously opposed the consumer provision notwithstanding the strong likelihood that it would
not have affected the consumer credit contracts that were the focus of the Association's concern.
See Memorandum from L.H. Wilson, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Am. Bankers Assoc. to Members of
Drafting Committee to Revise U.C.C. Article 1 and Interested Persons (May 3, 2001) (on file
with the author).
289. See, e.g., Am. Online, Inc. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699, 712 (Ct. App.
2001); Kubis & Perszyk Assocs., Inc. v. Sun Microsys., Inc., 680 A.2d 618, 618 (N.J. 1996); Am.
Online, Inc. v. Booker, 781 So. 2d 423, 425 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
290. The difficulty in getting state enactment of the UCITA "bomb shelter," legislation
intended to shield residents from the application of UCITA through adhesive choice of law
clauses, suggests just how hard the job might be. See infra text accompanying note 334.
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underlying state law protection the claimant asserts is applicable. If
the court agrees with the claimant, the breadth or narrowness of the
resulting precedent set by the opinion will be a matter of argument.
Such a precedent, whatever its scope, will give planners relatively
little pause concerning their power to choose law outside the
protected area that was the focus of the court's decision. Legislators,
on the other hand, have to concern themselves with the effect sheild
legislation will have on planning that does not implicate the state's
protective law. To formulate the legislation in such a way that a
choice of law provision is "void" or "unenforceable" under given
circumstances is probably to paint too broad of a brush. Our earliest
widely-enacted state legislation of this type in the United States did
paint with a broad brush. UCC Section 2A-106 provided simply that
a choice of law provision that fit its criteria was "not enforceable." ''
This would seem to require the drafter to take account not only of the
protective consumer rules of the customer's jurisdiction but also of
the jurisdiction's default rules, rules of interpretation, and the like.
Interstate businesses, of course, claim a preference for one
jurisdiction's set of rules in their transactions with customers
everywhere. Outside the area of protective legislation, this may be
non-controversial. It is probably more sensible-and more in accord
with current views on the matter-that a choice of law provision in
an adhesion contract be effective except where it will adversely
affect those to be protected by the legislation. Corrective legislation
thus should shield adherents from the effects of a choice of law
provision only to the extent they are deprived of the State law
protection to which they otherwise would be entitled.
Since it simply voided the choice of law in a consumer lease,
UCC Article 2A's formulation did not address the question of what
law would apply. 92 A formulation that voids only the adverse parts
of a choice of law provision probably should address the question.
Fortunately, there are several legislative models to which we might
291. U.C.C. § 2A-106(1) (2002). For a full quotation of Section 2A-106, see supra note 251.
292. Presumably that question was left to the forum's conflict of laws principles. Similarly,
UCC Section 2A-106(2), in avoiding choice of forum provisions, only avoided them if the
jurisdiction chosen would not otherwise have jurisdiction over the consumer. See U.C.C. § 2A106(2); quoted supra in note 251. This means that a choice of forum provision selecting the
(distant) vendor's forum would be enforceable if that forum could get non-consensual jurisdiction
over the customer through a long arm statute or because the contract was "made" in the (distant)
forum.
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look for guidance.
The granddaddy of legislation protecting customers from
adhesive choice of law provisions is the 1980 Rome Convention.293
Its Article 5, Paragraph 2 provides: "[A] choice of law made by the
parties shall not have the result of depriving the consumer of the
protection afforded to him by the mandatory rules of the law of the
country in which he has his habitual residence .. .294

The contracts

with "consumers" that are covered include "contract[s] the object of
which is the supply of goods or services to a person ('the consumer')
for a purpose which can be regarded as being outside his trade or
295
profession, or a contract for the provision of credit for that object.
The provision avoids only the effect of a choice of law provision on
the "mandatory rules" of a claimant's residence, leaving the
remainder in place. 6
The UCITA drafters proposed what might be regarded as a
narrower American version of the Rome Convention's rule, but went
in a different direction to insulate the protective law. Section 109 of
UCITA provides:
(a) The parties in their agreement may choose the
applicable law. However, the choice is not enforceable in a
consumer contract to the extent it would vary a rule that
may not be varied by agreement under the law of the
jurisdiction whose law would apply under subsections (b)
and (c) in the absence of the agreement.297
UCITA's formulation, by using the term "consumer contract,"
delivers protection to a narrower class of customers than would
either the Rome Convention or UCITA's own "mass-market"
construct.298 Moreover, instead of locating the unvariable law in the
place where the customer has his or her "habitual residence,"
UCITA's cross-reference imports the law of the place of delivery of
a tangible product, the place of the vendor in the case of online
delivery, or the place with the most significant relationship to the
293. Rome Convention, supra note 229, art. 5, para. 2.
294. Id.
295. Id. art. 5, para. 1.
296. See id. art. 5, para. 2.
297. U.C.I.T.A. § 109(a)(2002).
298. See id. § 102(a)(45) cmt. 39 (discussing the application of its new term "mass-market
transaction").
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'
transaction in "all other cases."299
As complex and narrow as this
protection may have been, it was apparently too much: both Virginia
and Maryland (the only states that enacted UCITA) changed the
wording to further narrow or eliminate the protection."'
Section 1-301 of the UCC provides another statutory model for
insulating a state's protective law from the effects of choice of law
clauses in adhesion contracts. Like UCITA, the provision, already
limited to "consumers" and to transactions within the scope of the

UCC, 3°1 was a little narrower than the Rome Convention, declaring

that a choice of law provision "may not deprive the consumer of the
protection of any rule of law governing a matter within the scope of
this section, which both is protective of consumers and may not be
varied by agreement ... ."'0'

Like the protection offered by the

Rome Convention, the invariable law was that of the state where the
consumer "principally resides" unless the consumer both made the
contract and took delivery of goods in a different jurisdiction.3 The
Official Comments make clear that "rule of law" refers to case law
and administrative regulations as well as to statutes.3 4
If the legislative objective is to protect one's residents from
losing their consumer or small business protection through adhesive
choice of law clauses, then the law to be protected should be that of
the jurisdiction within which they live or, as the Rome Convention
and UCC require, principally reside.3 0 ' That is the jurisdiction where

they participate in the political process, pay taxes, and, in effect,
choose their level of protection from business practices (and the
corresponding level of business regulation).
299. Id. § 109(b).
300. Virginia law provides that "[t]he parties in their agreement may choose the applicable
law. However, the choice is not enforceable in a consumer contract to the extent it would vary a
statute, administrative rule, or regulation that may not be varied by agreement under the law of
Virginia." VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-501.9(a) (2001). Virginia law applies in all other cases
(apparently regardless of the location of vendor, vendee, delivery, use, etc.). See id. § 59.1501.9(b).
Maryland law provides only that "[t]he parties in their agreement may choose the
applicable law." MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 22-109(a) (LexisNexis 2005).
301. See supra note 283.
302. U.C.C. § 1-301(e)(2) (2003).
303. Id. § 1-301(e)(2)(b).
304. Id. § 1-301(e)(2) cmt. 3.
305. Rome Convention, supra note 229, art. 5, para. 2 ("habitual residence"); U.C.C. § 1301(e)(2)(A) ("principally resides").
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This approach converts into legislation the limited voidability
that would be effected in litigation through judicial use of either
unconscionability or the reasonable expectations doctrines discussed
earlier.31 6 If, as seems likely, a court views a state's consumer
protection legislation and unconscionability decisions to be
"fundamental policy," this approach would also resemble a finding
under the dominant conflicts rule that a choice of law clause cannot
overcome a relevant state's "fundamental policy.""3 7
C. Summary of Legislative Considerations
for Choice of Law and Forum Limitations
Choice of law clauses have sufficient economic value in
negotiated contract settings so that no state would want to outlaw
them altogether-such action could impede economic activity and
would probably trigger corrective federal legislation.3 "8 Ideas of
party autonomy, together with the certainty that comes with choice
of law clauses, support enforcement of these clauses in settings
where there is true assent.30 9 While choice of law clauses in adhesion
contracts have been lumped in with negotiated contracts by many
courts,3"0 they are different in nearly all respects and, indeed, do not
carry a strong normative justification for widespread enforcement.
The problem is how to regulate one without harming the other.
Restricting protection to "non-negotiated" contracts would track the
economic rationale underlying contractual assent. But it would be
difficult to develop a workable definition to capture the parameters
of such a category.
The common method for delivering protection in other adhesive
settings has been to limit the protection to "consumers," narrowly
defined as they are in the UCC.31' In the context of shield legislation,
such a restriction is very under-inclusive. It could also signal a
legislative willingness to permit businesses to displace through
306. See supra text accompanying notes 166-209.
307. For a discussion of the "fundamental policy" doctrine in conflicts law, see supra text
accompanying notes 65-86.
308. For a discussion of the economic value of choice of law clauses, see supra note 241
309. For a discussion of party autonomy, see supra text accompanying notes 18-21. For a
discussion of the certainty that comes with choice of law clauses, see supra notes 241-242.
310. For an example, see supra text accompanying note 109.
311. See U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(11) (2003) (defining "consumer" as "an individual who enters
into a transaction primarily for personal, family, or household purposes").
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adhesive choice of law provisions the protection a state affords to its
non-consumers. The best of the alternatives to this overly-narrow
restriction is the mass-market contract, developed by the drafters of
UCITA" 2 and substantially improved by the Reporters in the ALI
Project discussed above." 3
Most states have many years of legislation and case law in place
that works to protect consumers and small businesses; little of that
was developed in an era of aggressive enforcement of choice of law
clauses in consumer settings.314 It is probably not enough to rely on
anti-waiver provisions that may be in some of that legislation:
indeed, even specific anti-waiver provisions have been neutralized
by choice of law clauses." 5 Protecting this older state law will
probably require special legislation that is not limited to a particular
type of transaction, such as Louisiana's legislation quoted earlier.3"6
For states now considering new or updated substantive legislation
designed to protect consumers or small business people from
perceived abuses within the economic system, it seems more
important than ever that the legislation contain a provision
preventing waiver either directly or indirectly through a choice of
law clause.3 17 Indeed, one commentator has suggested that, by not
including anti-choice of law provisions in the legislation itself, state
312. See supra notes 263-266 and accompanying text.
313. See supra text accompanying notes 272-279.
314. See Mathias Reimann, Savigny's Triumph? Choice of Law in Contracts Cases at the
Close of the Twentieth Century, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 571, 589 (1999) (discussing the historical
evolution of enforcement of choice of law clauses); Teresa M. Schwartz, The Consumer Product
Safety Commission: A Flawed Productof the Consumer Decade, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 32, 34
n.2 (1982) (citing S. REP. No. 749, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1972)) (noting that the 1960s is known
as the "Consumer Decade").
315. See Modem Computer Sys., Inc. v. Modem Banking Sys., Inc., 871 F.2d 734, 738-40
(8th Cir. 1989).
316. See supra text accompanying note 252.
317. In the wake of Modern Computer Systems, 871 F.2d 734, the Minnesota legislature
amended its franchise statute to make clear that a choice of law clause counted as a "waiver."
Wright-Moore Corp. v. Ricoh Corp., 908 F.2d 128, 133 (7th Cir. 1990). The provision now
provides:
Any condition, stipulation or provision, including any choice of law provision,
purporting to bind any person who, at the time of acquiring a franchise is a resident of
this state, or, in the case of a partnership or corporation, organized or incorporated
under the laws of this state, or purporting to bind a person acquiring any franchise to be
operated in this state to waive compliance or which has the effect of waiving
compliance with any provision of sections 80C.01 to 80C.22 or any rule or order
thereunder is void.
MINN. STAT. § 80C.21 (West 1999) (emphasis added).
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legislatures may actually intend that the protective legislation may be
displaced through choice of law clauses." 8 If a legislature does not
want a future court reading its legislation as implicitly authorizing an
opt-out through a vendor's adhesive choice of law clause, a provision
making the contrary intent clear will be imperative.
D. Closing the Back Door: Limiting Choice of
Forum Clauses to Limit Choice of Law Clauses
State legislation that limits the effectiveness of choice of forum
clauses is most obviously important to combat the direct effect that a
distant forum will have on the value of a consumer's or small
business's claim or defense. For example, traveling great distances,
potentially unfriendly fora, and out-of-state counsel could all
negatively affect the settlement value of any claim. But legislation
limiting choice of forum clauses is important for another, less
obvious, reason: it improves the odds that local courts (not the courts
of other jurisdictions) interpret their own jurisdiction's legislation or
precedents limiting choice of law provisions.
Any jurisdiction's rule constraining a choice of law clause will
have limited effectiveness outside the enacting state's courts. If
construed as a choice of law rule, only the enacting state's courts
would be duty bound to follow it;319 if considered a contract law rule,
non-enacting state courts would follow it only if they concluded that
the enacting state's law applied to the contract-for-law clause under
review."' The shield rule might apply outside the enacting state in
either case if the forum embraced it as the "fundamental policy" of
the enacting state, but there is no way for the state enacting a shield
law to guarantee such a result. Inevitably, then, shield laws bring
with them forum shopping incentives,32 1 and the enacting state's
318. Erin Ann O'Hara, Opting Out of Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis of Contractual
Choice ofLaw, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1551, 1580 (2000).
319. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(1) (1989) ("A court, subject to
constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice of law.").
320. See id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 25-28 (discussing how courts conclude
whether the enacting state's law applies).
321. Because a shield law is predominantly a forum rule, such legislation makes forum
shopping worthwhile for those seeking the protection of some state's local rules. But the problem
may be de minimus. An enacting state's residents are likely to bring suit in its own courts, and
the legislation could even limit protection to state residents so that out-of-state residents could not
avail themselves of the shield rule by seeking refuge in the enacting state's courts. Of course, if a
state wished to bring litigation into its courts for the economic advantages that such litigation
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beneficiaries might lose protection if they find themselves litigating
their contracts in other jurisdictions.
There are two ways for the enacting state to reduce those risks.
The less obvious of the two is to craft the shield legislation to
maximize its extraterritorial effect. Recall that the Restatement's
conflicts analysis of contractual choice of law requires the forum
court to defer to the (1) "fundamental policy" of another state with
(2) a materially greater interest in the controversy than the forum
state. 22
It will be difficult for the enacting state to control both legs of
this test, particularly when the drafter will declare that the contract is
"made" in the chosen state.3 23 But surely it is worthwhile for the

enacting state's legislature to proclaim that its rule limiting choice of
law provisions in the class of cases defined by the legislation is the
"fundamental policy" of the enacting state. A shield law that
protects a state's consumers and small businesses from dilution
through adhesive choice of law clauses could plausibly be viewed as
the enacting state's "fundamental policy," whether or not the
legislation itself proclaimed that to be true. But a declaration to that
effect surely improves the odds that it will be recognized by nonenacting states as such.
The more direct way to reduce the risks that a state's consumers
and small businesses will lose their local protection through
enforcement of adhesive choice of law clauses by out-of-state courts
is to limit choice of forum clauses for the same classes of claims and
claimants that the choice of law legislation is intended to protect.
might bring with it, the state could enact such a rule for the forum and not limit the protection to
state residents. Enacting "litigation seeking" rules would not be a new development. See, e.g.,
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1646.5 (West 2000 & Supp. 2005) (allowing the parties to contracts or
agreements worth $250,000 or greater to be governed by the laws of California as opposed to the
state where the usage is performed); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2708 (1999) (allowing parties to
contracts worth $100,000 or greater to agree in writing that the agreements be governed by the
laws of Delaware, notwithstanding any conflict of laws rules); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401
(McKinney 2001) (allowing parties to contracts worth $250,000 or greater to agree to be
governed by the laws of New York, notwithstanding that the contract is to be performed outside
of the state); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.51 (Vernon 2002) (allowing parties to contracts
worth $1,000,000 or greater to agree to any jurisdiction to govern the transaction so long as the
transaction bears a "reasonable relation" to that jurisdiction). The statutes cited above are
designed to attract large disputes; one suspects that a rule aimed at attracting consumer lawsuits
would generate more public costs than it would generate private revenues.
322. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187; see also supra text
accompanying notes 18-21.
323. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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Legislation limiting choice of forum clauses in some group of
adhesion contracts will, once again, be binding on the forum's own
courts as a legislative statement going to the court's own exercise of
jurisdiction.324 If suitably drafted,325 such legislation can also be
viewed as a general rule of the jurisdiction's contract law, applicable
across-the-board to all forms of dispute resolution. A provision that
limits the geographical location of a judicial forum or other forum
for dispute resolution in a specified class of contracts could treat
arbitration and judicial dispute resolution similarly, directly impact
contract remedies (and, by extension, the value of the contracts)
entered into by the state's residents, and, in that respect, appear to
operate within the boundaries of the Federal Arbitration Act.3" 6

324. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(1) (1971).
325. The Federal Arbitration Act complicates matters here. See Bryan L. Quick, Keystone,
Inc. v. Trial Systems Corporation: Is the Montana Supreme Court Undermining the Federal
ArbitrationAct?, 63 MONTANA L. REv. 445, 454 (2002) (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court has
interpreted the Federal Arbitration Act to preempt state courts from interpreting state statutes that
invalidate arbitration agreements). Restrictions on choice of forum clauses that do not extend to
arbitration, such as Section 2A-106(2) of the UCC, will (in our era of near universal customer
arbitration) be ineffective. See U.C.C. § 2A- 106(2) (2003), quoted supra note 251. The state of
Washington has corrected this gap in UCC Article 2A's coverage (and substantially improved the
effectiveness of its wording) by providing:
If the judicial forum or the forum for dispute resolution chosen by the parties to a
consumer lease is a jurisdiction other than a jurisdiction (a) in which the lessee resides
at the time the lease agreement becomes enforceable or within thirty days thereafter,
(b) in which the goods are to be used, or (c) in which the lease is executed by the
lessee, the choice is not enforceable.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.2A-106(2) (West 2003) (emphasis added). Presumably, the
effect of this provision is to mandate that all dispute resolution involving consumer leases with
Washington residents occur in Washington. It obviously affects arbitration proceedings, but it is
also an across-the-board contract rule and thereby should be shielded from challenge under
Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act which provides, in part, that contract provisions choosing
arbitration "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equityfor the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (emphasis added).
326. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.2A-106; discussion supra note 325; see also
Keystone, Inc. v. Triad Sys. Corp., 971 P.2d 1240, 1244-45 (Mont. 1998) (noting that the FAA
does not preempt Montana's state statute because the statute governs all contract law, not just
arbitration). Contra, Quick, supra note 325, at 462 (discussing how the Montana Supreme Court
in Keystone seemed to ignore the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Doctor's Associates, which
stated that courts may not interpret a state statute to invalidate an arbitration agreement because
such an interpretation would violate the FAA).
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V. PRACTICAL LIMITS TO STATE
LAWMAKING AND SOME ALTERNATIVES

A. PracticalLimits to State Lawmaking
This Article has suggested that judicial limits to choice of law
and forum clauses by state courts are likely to be ineffective in
preserving the legal protections a state provides to its consumers and
small businesses. State legislation is more promising for effective
limitations provided a state considers this to be a worthwhile effort.
That will certainly be an open question in many jurisdictions,
particularly those (like Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Utah, and
other states) that have created a legal environment favorable to
businesses at the likely expense of some consumers.3 27 Moreover, it
could be, as one commentator suggested, that states have not
heretofore limited such clauses in order to achieve the political
compromise necessary to pass protective consumer legislation in the
first place.328 If this is true, then state legislatures are enacting
protective legislation that businesses can simply choose to ignore (by
inserting into their adhesion contracts) a choice of law provision that
chooses another state's law. If this slight-of-hand is actually taking
place, then efforts to create and move forward shield legislation will
be doomed.
B. The Outlookfor FederalLawmaking as an Alternative
States that might otherwise be inclined towards protective
legislation can expect pointed, heavy lobbying against legislation
that will preserve the local rules and remedies favoring consumers
and small businesses. The current political scene suggests that
businesses have found a panacea in limiting or altering their
customers' legal environment through adhesion contracts and will
not easily relinquish this newly-found approach to managing
327. States like Delaware derive substantial state revenue by creating a legal environment
favorable to businesses. Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation
Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 240-42 (1985) (noting that Delaware derives 16.9% of its
revenue from corporate franchise taxes, whereas the closest state, Pennsylvania, derives only
9.8%). This revenue likely benefits the state's resident consumers and small businesses in a
general way. Id. at 240-41. However that may be, it is clear that the public revenue generated at
the state level does not benefit the consumers and small businesses of other states to which
Delaware law might be exported.
328. See O'Hara, supra note 318, at 1572.
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compliance with multi-state regulation.
For example, the American Bankers Association opposed (with
apparent success) the consumer protection provision of the
innovative U.C.C. Section 1-301(e) 329 and has also pressed courts to

enforce choice of law, arbitration, and class action waiver clauses in
litigation involving credit card issuers.33 ° It has pressed a strong

economic argument33 ' against local regulation and in favor of a
national standard. There may well be merit in such an argument:
individual state regulation of commercial law arguably makes no
sense in a national economy. In addition, national standards and

rules may well be more sensible as an economic and commercial
33 2

matter.

But there is a critical difference between a national set of rules,
emanating from Congress, and the implications of developments
discussed here. Creating what amounts to a national standard
through aggressive enforcement of choice of law clauses is still
single-state regulation; it is not federal regulation through the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency or other nationally-accountable
body. Allowing one state's legislature to legislate for and bind the
citizens of all other states is a perversion of the constitutional system
329. Memorandum from L.H. Wilson, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Am. Bankers Ass'n, to Members
of Drafting Comm. to Revise U.C.C. Article 1 and Interested Persons (May 3, 2001) (on file with
the author).
330. E.g., Brief for American Bankers Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petition for
Writ of Certiorari at 3-4, Discover Bank v. Szetela, 537 U.S. 1226 (2002) (No. 02-829), 2002
WL 32133743 (arguing the lower court erred in refusing to enforce the bank's "no class action"
clause from the contract due to unconscionability); Brief of Amici Curiae Florida Bankers Ass'n
and American Bankers Ass'n in Support of Petitioner at 8, Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna, 125 S.Ct. 2937 (2005) (No. 04-1264), 2005 WL 1254196 (arguing that the lower
court's refusal to enforce arbitration clause was motivated by impermissible hostility towards
arbitration).
33 1. In its letter to the Article I Drafting Committee, the American Bankers Association said:
Financial institutions with customers residing in another state will need to become
experts on the consumer protection laws of the other jurisdiction. Companies serving
customers in multiple states will be forced to contend with a patchwork of state laws.
This new "safeguard" will have a negative impact on the efficiency, competition, and
use of standard procedures. It ignores the national and global nature of our economy.
Memorandum from L.H. Wilson, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Am. Bankers Ass'n, to Members of
Drafting Committee to Revise U.C.C. Article I and Interested Persons (May 3, 2001) (on file
with the author).
332. Scholars have made calls for a national commercial code since nearly the beginning of
the UCC enactment process. See, e.g., Robert Braucher, Federal Enactment of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 100, 104 (1951); William A. Schnader, The
Uniform CommercialCode-Today and Tomorrow, 22 BuS. LAW. 229, 231 (1966).
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we have in place and the democratic ideals that underpin it.
Some states have created shield rules specifically designed to
inhibit the displacement of their law through choice of law clauses.333
But they have typically done so in narrow, specific contexts. One
recent effort is that of several states to build legal "bomb shelters" to
protect their citizens from the application of Virginia's or
Maryland's UCITA. Four states thus far have constructed these
"bomb shelters,'

but recent efforts to pass such narrow, protective

legislation in other states have not been successful. Efforts to outlaw
class action waivers in adhesion contracts are meeting very
substantial resistance from business groups.335 Limitations on
arbitration may well have to proceed at the federal level,336 but efforts
there have been strongly opposed by industry.337 Both class action
waivers and UCITA provisions are far easier to demonize than are
choice of law and, to a lesser extent, choice of forum clauses.
Without UCITA or some other rhetorical bogeyman, getting state
333. See supra text accompanying notes 244-245 (discussing shield laws in the context of
consumer protection).
334. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 554D.104, 554D.125 (West 2001 & Supp. 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 66-329 (2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2463a (Supp. 2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-8-15
(LexisNexis 2006).
335. In 2005, Rhode Island legislature passed H. 5985, a bill that would forbid enforcement of
class action waivers in consumer contracts. H. 5985, 2005 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2005). The bill
was vetoed by the governor after an intense lobbying campaign led by the Chamber of Commerce
on one side and a substantial consortium of consumer groups on the other. See Press Release,
Public Citizen, National Public Interest Organizations Urge Rhode Island's Governor to Sign
Consumer Protection Bill, (July 12, 2005) http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/release.cfm?
ID=1986. California has accomplished the same outcome through its courts in cases such as Aral
v. Earthlink, Inc., 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 229 (Ct. App. 2005). Utah, of course, has gone in the opposite
direction. See supra text accompanying notes 188-189.
336. If enacted as a broad limitation on contractual provisions governing forum, state
restrictions that also governed the location of arbitration might survive a challenge as being valid
as a general contract restriction under Section 2 of the FAA. Cf supra note 325 (discussing how
state actions that restrict arbitrationclauses may be federally pre-empted by the FAA but that
general restrictions on contract provisions are permissible).
337. The Fairness and Voluntary Arbitration Act (FVAA) would have given each party to a
"sales and service contract" the option of rejecting arbitration after a controversy arose but before
arbitration proceedings began. H.R. 534, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999). Under the FVAA, "the term
,sales and service contract' means a contract under which any person (including any
manufacturer, importer or distributor) sells any product to any other person for resale to an
ultimate purchaser and authorizes such other person to repair and service such product." Id. This
legislation was never enacted and was strongly opposed by industry groups, such as the U.S.
Chamber Institute for Legal Reform and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. See Fairness and
Voluntary Arbitration Act: Hearingon H.R. 534 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin.
Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 54-59 (1999) (statement of James Wooton,
President, U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform).
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legislators interested in limiting these more esoteric provisions will
likely be very difficult. A first step in such an agenda will be a
clearer understanding of how the law governing those provisions
works and the effects the clauses can have on a state's own efforts to
protect its consumers and small businesses.
C. The Free Market as a Limit on
Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses
Before considering whether there might be a less direct federal
response to these developments, it is worth considering whether the
power of the market might be harnessed, making other kinds of
solutions unnecessary. Perhaps the dominant (though empirically
untested) economic theory for enforcing adhesion contracts as
written is the notion that some adherents actually read the forms and
react to them by purchasing elsewhere.338 In a very competitive
mass-market, even a few altered purchase decisions could be
important to a vendor and so, the story goes, vendors have reasons to
self-regulate what they put into their adhesion contracts.339
It is arguably something of an anomaly that class action waivers,
binding mandatory arbitration clauses, choice of forum clauses, and,
to a lesser extent (because no adherent can know what they mean),
choice of law clauses persist in the marketplace despite the near
uniform condemnation of such provisions by consumer advocacy
groups.3"' There are several ways to interpret these apparently
conflicting facts: that virtually no consumers read or understand the
vendors' forms and, therefore, do not react to them through their
" ' that they do read the forms but think nothing
purchase decisions;34
338. Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect
Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 660 (1979). Contra
Eisenberg, supra note 143, at 244.
339. See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 338, at 660.
340. For example, a group of self-styled "National Public Interest Organizations" issued a
press release on July 12, 2005, urging the governor of Rhode Island to sign the legislation
limiting class action waivers. Press Release, Public Citizen, supra note 335. The coalition
included: ACORN, Alliance for Justice, American Association for People with Disabilities,
Center for Auto Safety, Center for Responsible Lending, Consumer Action, Consumer Federation
of America, Consumer Task Force for Automotive Issues, Consumers for Auto Reliability and
Safety, Consumers Union, National Association of Consumer Advocates, Lawyers' Committee
for Civil Rights Under Law, National Community Reinvestment Coalition, National Consumer
Law Center, National Employment Lawyers Association, Public Citizen, Rhode Island Public
Interest Research Group, USAction, and Workplace Fairness. Id.
341. A relatively recent newspaper article described a software vendor's experiment to
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of the provisions;141 that some adherents read and understand the
forms and react to them but not enough to offset the perceived
benefits to the businesses; that there is no competition in the market
on these terms, and the adherents therefore have no choices anyway;
and/or that the consumer advocates are hopelessly out of touch.
Expanded communications and "connectivity" might offer a
chance at more direct market control of these provisions, provided
that there is room among the vendors for competition on the terms of
their agreements. In February 2005, StopBMA, a coalition of
consumer groups, created a website with the provocative address
"Givemebackmyrights.com" to educate consumers about binding
mandatory arbitration clauses ("BMA's") and give consumers the
tools to resist them.343 Among those tools is information about which
vendors do not require BMA for dispute resolution, as well as forms
consumers can mail back to vendors that purport to reject the
BMA's.3"
It is impossible to know how effective this effort has been, but
one must be skeptical. After a burst of news stories and related
publicity,34 5 the media seemed to have lost interest in adhesive
arbitration issues, at least until very recently.346 If consumers have
discover the extent to which adherents actually read the forms. See Jeff Gelles, Don 't Ignore
Those Click-and-Agree Contracts, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 11, 2005, at COI. They buried a $1000
reward in 900 words of boilerplate. Id. It took over four months and 3000 downloads of the
product before someone discovered the offer and claimed it. Id.
342. This, in turn, could mean that the adherents are exercising a rational cost-benefit choice.
See generally Ware, supra note 6, at 212 (arguing that sellers might charge more for goods if
consumers insisted on altering the terms). Alternatively, it could mean that because customers
overvalue immediate consumption, they may not be rationally choosing. Cf id. at 220-21 n.97
(arguing that some consumers undervalue their procedural rights and too readily alienate them).
343. See Give
Me
Back
My
Rights
Coalition, About
Us
& Contact,
http://www.givemebackmyrights.com/bma-about.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2006).
344. Id.
345. Give Me Back My Rights Coalirion, Take Action!,
http://www.givemebackmyrights.com/bma-takeaction.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2006).
346. On October 26, 2006, Los Angeles Times Magazine ran a feature story that was very
negative about many different forms of arbitration, emphasizing in particular consumer
arbitration. Eric Berkowitz, Is Justice Served?, Los ANGELES TIMES MAGAZINE, Oct. 22, 2006,
at 20, available at http://www.latimes.com/features/printedition/magazine/la-tm-arbitrate43
oct22,1,6981618.story?ctrack=l&cset-true. Another potential harbinger of change is the John
Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, the enrolled version of H.R.
5122, signed by the President on October 17, 2006. John Warner National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, 120 Stat. 2083 (2006). This act provides that in
lending agreements covering servicemen,
Notwithstanding section 2 of [the Federal Arbitration Act], or any other Federal or
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begun reading the boilerplate or are becoming resistant to mandatory
arbitration, then such scenarios have not been reported. The Utah
legislature's embrace of adhesive class action waivers at the behest
of the banks suggests that neither has much to fear from consumer
pushback on arbitration.347 Once again, the lack of consumer market
pressure could signal market success (everyone is being rational and
no one cares348) or market failure (consumers are irrational about
dispute resolution clauses or lack the means with which to value
them 349).

However one might interpret the relative quiet about adhesive
arbitration, the odds that the market can work for the choice of law
clauses considered here are abysmally low. 3 5 The problem is simply
too abstract and difficult. Whether a given state's law is "better" or
"worse" for consumers depends on specifics that might well be too
difficult to include in a website's menu system without making it
unwieldy. 351 Legislators that are otherwise inclined to shield local
law protecting their consumers and small business people ought not
State law, rule or regulation, no agreement to arbitrate any dispute involving the
extension of consumer credit shall be enforceable against any covered member or
dependent of such a member, or any person who was a covered member or dependent
of that member when the agreement was made.
Id. at § 697(f)(4). Consumer advocates have for years believed that if Congress could be made to
understand the problems with consumer arbitration in any context, it would be a first step in
getting Congressional attention to the issues more generally. This may have been a first step.
347. See supra text accompanying notes 188-189.
348. Cf Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 338 (arguing that if consumers comparison shop,
firms will compete on terms).
349. Id. (arguing that if consumers are unaware of terms, the market price will reflect a higher
price and therefore a welfare loss to consumers).
350. See supra note 140.
351. An indirect form of market control of adhesive arbitration provisions may have come
from Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, large buyers of residential mortgages. Perhaps influenced by
pressure from consumer groups, these entities announced in December 2003 and February 2004
(respectively) that they would no longer purchase residential mortgages containing binding
mandatory arbitration clauses in them. Fannie Mae No Longer Investing in MandatoryArbitration Loans, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 5, 2004, at C3. That was followed by a decision by
CitiFinancial that it would no longer include such clauses in its real estate loans. Erick Bergquist,
CitiFinancialChanges Loan Practices,AM. BANKER (USA), May 20, 2005, at 20. The decisions
by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae made mortgages containing binding mandatory arbitration
clauses less marketable (and therefore less valuable) and in that respect could be expected to
influence the behavior of mortgage lenders as, perhaps, illustrated by CitiFinancial's decision that
followed. Whether other lenders will follow suit, and to what extent, remains to be seen. A
public decision by JAMS, an arbitration provider, to refuse to recognize class action waivers in
arbitration clauses was reversed shortly thereafter owing, no doubt, to pressure from businesses.
See Gipson v. Cross Country Bank, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1289 (M.D. Ala. 2005).
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wait for the imagined market to do their work for them.
D. FederalismRevisited

While the focus has been on the dilution of state protective law
through adhesive choice of law clauses, the real problem we have
been examining here is, at its core, a problem of federalism. How
should our constitutional system best accommodate the fact that we
have multiple legal regimes that can legitimately claim some interest
Businesses have an
in governing the transactions at issue?
understandable desire for certainty and, perhaps, for a single set of
consumer and small business rules with which to comply. Their use
of choice of law and forum clauses can be seen as an imaginative
attempt to obtain a single set of rules. But those rules are the rules of
only one state, a regulatory balance that (inevitably) will not be
shared by other states.
If a single set of standards is the objective, federal legislation
that provides uniform consumer and small business protection for the
entire United States is the obvious solution. But this solution is not
likely to appear anytime soon. We have always left nearly all
lawmaking in the commercial and consumer law areas to the states;352
our UCC is the current compromise that attempts to reconcile the
need for uniform standards with this very strong tradition of state
lawmaking.
But however one views the success of the UCC, the uniform
laws approach to consumer law has not been nearly so successful.
The showpiece, the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, created in 1968,
has been enacted in only eleven states.353 There remains substantial
diversity among states in how best to accommodate business needs
with consumer and small business protection, and this diversity-a
central and generally positive feature of our federal system-makes
effective federal (or uniform state) legislation both difficult and
unlikely. If Congress is unwilling to completely take over the job of
consumer and small business protection, we will probably be stuck
with this state diversity in protective rules for the foreseeable future.
352. See Allen R. Kamp, Downtown Code: A History of the Uniform Commercial Code
1949-1954, 49 BUFFALO L. REv. 359, 368 (2001).
353. See supra note 3; see also Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalismand the
Uniform Laws Process:Some Lessonsfrom the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 83,
125 n.193 (1993) (noting that seven states and Guam enacted the 1968 version, while four states
enacted the 1974 version).
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There is a positive role for Congress here, however, even if it
falls far short of a very unlikely federalization of consumer law.354
The current situation is an uneasy one-aggressive interstate
projection of state law via choice of law clauses, on the one hand,
and defensive measures by other states via judicial decisions and
"bomb shelter"-type legislation, on the other. This tug-of-war and its
underlying contract and conflict of law issues create substantial legal
uncertainty. Will a given choice of law clause be recognized in other
state courts and to what extent? What state's contract law will be
applicable?
Will "bomb shelter" and similar legislation be
recognized by non-enacting states? Will parties use forum shopping
to jockey for strategic advantage on these issues? A central problem
with the current system is that the limitations on contracts-for-law,
both from the contracts and conflicts cases and statutes, can vary
with the forum.355 Because no business can completely limit where a
claim may be brought, no business can achieve the planning certainty
it desires in its mass-market transactions.
This legal uncertainty is, of course, harmful as a commercial
matter. What may be worse, the attempted solution described hereaggressive projection of one state's policy into other states and the
defensive responses to those efforts by other states-is antithetical to
the interstate cooperation and comity that is necessary in our federal
system. The resulting friction does no one any good.
Europe faced similar issues in its early efforts at economic
integration, and its solution, memorialized in the Rome Convention,
was to create a European choice of law rule applicable in all the
member states-a rule that both eliminated diversity in member
states' conflicts rules and, at the same time, preserved member state
diversity in consumer protection and other strongly held, normallyapplicable mandatory rules.356 Congress could do the same thing
with legislation that sets forth the circumstances under which a
state's consumer and small business law will survive despite a choice
of law clause in a contract. Such legislation would, in effect, create a

354. Thanks to my colleague Rick Greenstein for initially pointing out this possibility. A
somewhat different approach to the analogous problem of diverse state rules for payment systems
is found in Mark E. Budnitz, Consumer Payment Products and Systems: The Need for Uniformity
and the Risk ofPoliticalDefeat, 24 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 247, 277-80 (2005).
355. See supra text accompanying note 352.
356. See Rome Convention, supra, note 229.
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federal choice of law rule for the limited circumstances and classes
of cases defined in the legislation. In its narrowest form, such a rule
could validate choice of law clauses in contracts and then track the
protective language set forth in the promulgated version of U.C.C.
Section 1-301(e)(2).357 A better version, one desirable given the
similarities between small business and consumer adhesion contracts,
could define "consumer" more broadly or create a class of "massmarket contracts" for protection.358
Such an effort would effectively alter and unify state conflict of
laws rules for these limited purposes. While it would preserve rather
than destroy state diversity, it would also reduce forum shopping that
results from diverse conflict of laws rules at the state level.359 More
ambitious36 ° federal legislation might explicitly require that federal,
" ' By
not state, law control the underlying contract questions as well.36
providing a federal rule for the contract analysis, such legislation
would, by its nature, eliminate the threshold conflict of laws
questions and would eliminate much of the diversity in contract law
analysis otherwise found in state contract law. The result would be
an even more predictable business environment, but also one that
preserved our state diversity in consumer protection.
To be sure, federal legislation of the kind described here would
not reduce the costs businesses must sustain in their exposure to the
protective laws of fifty different states. We have had a national
economy for many years, and compliance with diverse state law has
been an unavoidable side effect of developing commercial and
consumer law at the state level. The contention here is that those
compliance costs can be reduced only by federal legislation
establishing national norms for such consumer protection357. The provision, applicable only to the UCC's "consumer," is quoted supra note 223.
358. See supra text accompanying notes 259-268 (discussing the similarities between small
businesses and consumers in the context of state legislation).
359. See Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and TerritorialStates: The Constitutional
Foundationsof Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 249, 310-11 (1992).
360. There is probably more state diversity on the contract law issues involving adhesion
contracts than there is on the conflict of laws issues. Reaching an appropriate compromise on the
"best" rule to craft out of that diversity will be very difficult.
361. See Stephen Burbank, Federalism And Private International Law: Implementing The
Hague Choice of Court Convention in the United States 20-22 (Univ. of Pa. L. Sch. Public Law,
Working Paper No. 06-27, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract-921200 (last
visited Sept. 30, 2006) (discussing uniform federal conflicts law in reference to the Hague
Convention).

Fall 2006]

CONSTRAINING OPT-OUTS

legislation Congress is not likely to develop.
The end-run around state-to-state legal diversity that has been
the primary focus of this Article-using choice of law clauses to
embrace the norms of a single state-is illegitimate and inherently
unstable; we can expect retaliation by states that believe their
residents are entitled to local protection.
Nonetheless, were
Congress to clarify the extent to which consumers and small
businesses retained their state law protection in the marketplace, it
would add predictability and reduce the incentives that now exist for
forum shopping. In the meantime, protective state legislation of the
kind described earlier-a proliferation, as it were, of state "bomb
shelters"-may provide the added benefit of getting Congress's
attention.
VI. CONCLUSION

Every state limits "contracting out" to some extent. Most would
hold that parties cannot "contract out" of law that represents the
"fundamental policy" of another state under at least limited
circumstances. But courts of different states can come to different
conclusions about what is "fundamental," and, what is worse, the
conflicts rules themselves are not uniform to begin with. To
exacerbate the situation, the contract law that underpins
enforceability of a choice of law clause is widely divergent. Finally,
the State conflicts rules that decide which contract law should apply
in the first instance are widely divergent as well.
One premise of this Article has been that the diverse state laws
protecting residents from business excesses is part of our federal
scheme-that we seem to believe that the diversity is a good thing,
and that it is a perversion of that scheme when one state's legislature
sets protection standards that are imposed on customers everywhere
through choice of law clauses in mass-market contracts.362 A second
premise is that "unwaivable" rules should not become "waivable"
through choice of law clauses in mass-market adhesion contracts.363
Some recent judicial decisions have sensitively addressed the
362. In this respect, this author believes that Marquette National Bank of Minnesota v. First
of Omaha, 439 U.S. 299 (1978), which led to the prospect of one state's legislature effectively
neutralizing the usury standards for the rest of the country, was a very unfortunate decision.
Luckily, there are not many examples of this phenomenon to date.
363. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
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underlying issues, others have simply assumed the problems away in
part, no doubt, because they were hidden beneath difficult legal
principles." It is hoped that advocates will begin to utilize the rich
tools that conflict of laws and contract law supply for dealing with
choice of law clauses when they displace the state law protection to
which their clients are normally entitled.
But small disputes will not carry the legal costs of this sort of
legal argument and the arbitrators who will likely hear most of the
smaller cases may have few reasons to entertain elaborate legal
discourse on questions that seem to be on the periphery. In any
event, no one will likely know whether arbitrators have listened since
their decisions typically leave no record. While it will be difficult
politically, a state can have more confidence in the controls over its
own protective law if it develops legislation that shields its important
protections from waiver through choice of law clauses. This Article
has attempted to develop some of the issues that states will have to
face if they embark on this task. It seems quite clear that depending
on "market control" in this area will not suffice.
But both the projection of one state's law into other states
through choice of law clauses and the defensive strategies outlined
here create a larger problem of interstate relations in our federal
system. Ultimately, it is the responsibility of Congress to "regulate
'
Commerce... among the several States."365
Federal unification of
state consumer protection and other protective law would likely be
impossible. The range and diversity of state law, after more than two
centuries of development, is too vast.
As I have suggested, however, Congress could greatly improve
commercial certainty, yet preserve the state diversity that is a
hallmark of our system, with a federal choice of law rule that
uniformly shields the rich diversity of state protective law.
Federalizing the contract law underlying choice of law clauses would
be an extension of such an effort, but, again, state diversity in the
adhesion contract law area will make the job formidable.
In our current political climate, it seems extremely dubious that
either a federal conflicts rule for this purpose, or a federal contracts
rule for choice of law clauses, will have a great deal of political
364. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
365. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl.
3.
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appeal.
The issues are abstruse and there are no obvious
beneficiaries. But perhaps the pressure of globalization will provide
political fuel. The recent Hague Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements,366 the ALI's intellectual property project mentioned
earlier,367 and the ALI's Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments: Analysis and Proposed Federal Statute36 are only three
examples of contemporary projects designed, in part, to address
diversity in conflict of laws-related rules. Maybe the time has finally
come to address these arcane issues at the core of our federal system.
Until we do, legitimate state efforts to protect state lawmaking
prerogatives, and the resulting state-to-state friction and inefficiency,
may be our fate.

366. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements, June 30, 2005,
http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act-conventions.pdf&cid=98 (last visited Sept. 30, 2006).
367. See supra text accompanying note 267.
368. AM. L. INST., RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS
AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE, PROPOSED FOREIGN JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT ACT § 5(b) cmt. f, at 61 (Proposed Final Draft 2005).
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